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THE PAQUETE HABANA: A CASE HISTORY IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Scott w. Stuckyt 
In The Paquete Habana, decided in 1900, the United States Supreme 
Court adopted the doctrine that coastal fishing vessels are exempt from 
capture as prize of war. The Court held that the exemption was an estab-
lished custom of international law, which-in the absence of a controlling 
executive or judicial decision-should be incorporated into the corpus of 
our common law. The Paquete Habana influenced the development of 
positive rules of international law that expanded the class of civilian vessels 
that are exempt from capture. Recently, the lower federal courts have be-
gun to utilize The Paquete Habana as precedent for the incorporation of 
international law other than that governing the conduct of naval warfare. 
In this article, the author analyzes the decision and its historical anteced-
ents and examines the applicability of The Paquete Habana principle to 
twentieth century naval conflicts involving the United States. The author 
contends that the overriding importance of The Paquete Habana is its role 
as a monument to the continuing vitality of international law. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Paquete Rabana and The Lola,l often-cited prize cases decided 
by the United States Supreme Court in 1900, share a fate akin to that of 
Southey's Battle of Blenheim,2 being more praised than analyzed. The 
cases arose at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War when two Cu-
ban fishing vessels, the Paquete Habana and the Lola, were captured by a 
United States naval blockade squadron. Both vessels were removed from 
Cuban waters and sold by the United States as prizes of war. Appeals 
challenging these sales subsequently were filed in the Supreme Court, and 
the cases were consolidated for argument and decision. Although The 
Paquete Rabana is a staple of introductory casebooks in international 
t B.A. summa cum laude, Wichita State University, 1970; J.D. Harvard Law School, 
1973; M.A., Trinity University, 1980; LL.M. highest honors, George Washington 
University. The author is presently Deputy Division Chief, Legislative Division, 
Office of the Judge Advocate General, United States Air Force. 
l. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). Unless otherwise noted, the name The Paquete Habana will 
refer to both cases. 
2. "And everybody praised the DukeIWho this great fight did win./'But what good 
came of it at last?' Quoth little Peterkin./'Why, that I cannot tell,' said he;/'But 
'twas a famous victory.''' R. SOUTHEY, THE BATTLE OF BLENHEIM (1798). 
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law,3 it has received little thorough analysis. This article subjects the 
case to a deeper probing and explores the origins of the case, the influ-
ences that produced the opinion, and the effect of the opinion on twenti-
eth century international law. 
Because The Paquete Habana was a Spanish-American War prize 
case, Section II of this article traces the development of United States 
prize law prior to 1898 and the nineteenth century efforts to establish an 
internationally accepted law of prize. Section III discusses the back-
ground of the Spanish-American War relevant to The Paquete Habana 
decision, particularly the blockade of Cuba. Section IV reviews the 
course of The Paquete Habana from the captures through the final 
Supreme Court decision and the predilection of Justice Horace Gray, au-
thor of the initial Supreme Court opinion, to analyze issues in light of 
historical developments. The Paquete Habana opinion is analyzed in 
Section V, with emphasis on its effect on the legal community. Section 
VI discusses the impact of the case on international law, especially its 
effect on the Second Hague Conference of 1907, which enacted into posi-
tive international law the prize law principle that coastal fishing vessels 
are immune from capture. Sections VII and VIII examine the principle 
as applied in this century's two world wars. Section IX identifies the 
relevance of the principle to, and examines its use in, the limited war 
situations that have occurred since 1945. Finally, Section X examines 
the impact of The Paquete Habana on the current attitude of the United 
States toward international law in areas other than prize law. 
II. UNITED STATES PRIZE LAW PRIOR TO 1898 
The American law of maritime prize is older than the nation itself. 
In fact, maritime prize law gave rise to the first distinctively federal court 
under the Confederation - the Court of Appeals in Cases of Prize and 
Capture. 4 The genesis of American maritime prize law, however, re-
sulted from the work of John Marshall and his brethren on the Supreme 
Court during the War of 1812. The origin of the war with regard to 
neutral rights and naval impressment, together with the imposition of a 
general embargo shortly before war was declared, produced an extraordi-
nary number of prize cases for the Court. 5 
3. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 26 (3d ed. 1971); C. 
FENWICK, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (2d ed. 1951); M. McDOUGAL & 
W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUB-
LIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY 77 (1981); H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS: MATERIALS AND TEXT 531 (1976); B. WES-
TON, R. FALK, & A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A 
PROBLEM-ORIENTED CASEBOOK 174 (1980). 
4. See generally H. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT: THE FEDERAL Ap-
PELLATE PRIZE COURT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1977); J. GOEBEL, 
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 in 1 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 
DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 147-95 (1971). 
5. G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-
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The most famous of these was The Schooner Exchange v. McFad-
don,6 which has been called "one of the great fundamental decisions in 
internationallaw."7 In establishing that an armed foreign public vessel, 
formerly taken as prize by the French, was immune from subsequent 
American admiralty jurisdiction, Justice Marshall promulgated a princi-
ple that has endured in American law. 8 After canvassing the state of 
international practice, Justice Marshall emphasized the limiting effect of 
international law and custom on domestic jurisdiction. In Justice Mar-
shall's view, the values inherent in "distinct sovereignties. . . whose mu-
tual benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other and by an 
interchange of those good offices which humanity dictates"9 necessitated 
a reciprocal relaxation of otherwise complete municipal authority. 
The Schooner Exchange was not the only prize case arising during 
the war. The Court also decided cases on such recurring issues of prize 
law as the "days of grace" allowed to expatriate goods from Britain,1O the 
problems associated with American or neutral individuals or firms hav-
ing enemy commercial domiciles, II the rights of individuals shipping 
neutral goods on British ships,12 and the use of neutral flags as a cover to 
ship enemy goods. 13 
In view of this outpouring of prize cases, it is not surprising that, at 
the end of the war, Henry Wheaton, later the Supreme Court's reporter, 
1815 in 2 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 438-39 (1971). 
6. II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
7. I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 425-26 (1937). 
The fact that the principle prize reports available at that time were Sir William 
Scott's from the first Napoleonic War, see 1-6 C. Rob. Adm. (1798-1808); E. Ros-
COE, LORD STOWELL, HIS LIFE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH PRIZE LAW 
(1916) (passim), together with Justice Story's opinion that English precedent should 
control, G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 442; see The Nereide, 13 U.S. 
(9 Cranch) 388, 436-56 (1815); The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 287-88, 299 
(1814), caused a certain lack of solicitude for neutral rights in some cases. Chief 
Justice Marshall strongly fought this tendency, making the case for an American 
prize law better suited to a state that was not a great naval power and that, as a 
matter of policy, attempted to avoid involvement in European wars. See The Venus, 
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253 (1814) (Marshall, C. J.); G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra 
note 5, at 441-42, 449. He prevailed, and a pragmatic attitude toward English pre-
cedent came to be accepted, one that fit the nation's nineteenth and twentieth-cen-
tury policy emphasis on neutral rights. G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra note 5, 
at 449. 
8. See, e.g., Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562,574 (1926) (extending the 
principle elucidated in The Schooner Exchange to merchant ships of foreign govern-
ments); see also Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587-88 (1943) (citing The Schooner 
Exchange for the proposition that executive branch action preempts jurisdiction of 
the district court on the issue of immunity). 
9. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136-37 (1812). 
10. The Thomas Gibbons, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 421 (1814). 
11. The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253 (1814). 
12. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815); Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191 (1815). 
13. Cargo of the Ship Hazard v. Campbell, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 205 (1815). 
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authored the first American treatise on prize law, A Digest of the Law of 
Maritime Capture and Prize. 14 This book contains a significant number 
of American cases that demonstrate the Court's divergence from English 
law. 15 The book is also a useful aid in analyzing The Paquete Habana 
because it contains perhaps the first American statement on the central 
question in The Paquete Habana: Are fishing vessels immune from cap-
ture? Wheaton wrote: 
[I]t has been usual in maritime wars to exempt from capture 
fishing boats and their cargoes, both from views of mutual ac-
commodation between neighboring countries, and from tender-
ness to a poor and industrious order of people. This custom, so 
honorable to the humanity of civilized nations, has fallen into 
disuse; and it is remarkable that both France and England mu-
tually reproach each other with that breach of good faith which 
has finally abolished it. 16 
Wheaton was mistaken in stating that the custom had disappeared; 
although, as noted in The Paquete Habana opinion, the status of the cus-
tom had been uncertain during the early Napoleonic WarsY The fa-
mous English writer, Joseph Chitty (upon whom Wheaton clearly 
relied), gave a brief but accurate account of the early nineteenth century 
English view in his Treatise on the Law of Nations: 18 "In some wars, it 
has been usual to make an exception in favour of small fishing-vessels, 
from tenderness to a poor and industrious order of people. This, how-
ever, as appears from the case of The Young Jacob and Johanna, is a 
matter of forbearance, and not of right." 19 
The case of The Young Jacob and Johanna 20 was the leading English 
authority on the issue of the fishing boat exemption. In that case, a small 
Dutch fishing boat was taken by a British ship while returning from the 
Dogger Bank to Holland. Although Sir William Scott recognized that it 
had been the general custom in former wars not to make prizes of such 
vessels, he stated that this was a rule of comity only, not of international 
law. Thus, under general principles of prize law, the vessel could be con-
demned as one engaged in enemy trade. To the argument that such boats 
bore no national character, but frequently came to England to sell their 
fish, Scott replied that the argument need not be addressed because the 
indicia in this case pointed to Dutch trade. Moreover, Scott stated that 
14. H. WHEATON, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF MARITIME CAPTURE AND PRIZE 
(1815). 
15. Id.; G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 452. 
16. H. WHEATON, supra note 14, at 60-61. 
17. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 691-93 (1900). 
18. J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NATIONS, RELATIVE TO THE 
LEGAL EFFECT OF WAR ON THE COMMERCE OF BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRALS; 
AND ON ORDERS IN COUNCIL AND LICENSES (1812). 
19. Id. at 87. 
20. 1 C. Rob. Adm. 20 (1798). 
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there was a strong indication of fraud in this case.21 
The Young Jacob and Johanna thus indicates a rather mixed atti-
tude toward the fishing boat exemption. The existence of a general prac-
tice based on comity was accepted; however, the conditional and 
nonbinding nature of the exemption was emphasized. The holding was 
further complicated by Scott's statement that fraud was strongly indi-
cated. Tacit recognition of the exemption combined with the belief that 
it was only a matter of comity, rather than a rule of international law, 
would mark the English attitude on the question of fishing vessel immu-
nity for another century. 
With the end of the War of 1812, American prize courts ceased ac-
tivity. The next major developments in the American law of prize came 
with the Civil War. The nature of the Civil War at sea - an internecine 
conflict between an established government attempting to blockade an 
enormous length of coastline, and an insurgent regime seeking supplies, 
trade, and recognition abroad - naturally gave rise to a different mix of 
questions than had the War of 1812. Particularly important were ques-
tions regarding the status of the conflict as a "war" under international 
law, the rights of neutrals colorably attempting to trade with the Confed-
eracy, and the character of property owned by domiciliaries of the Con-
federacy (i.e., whether such property was contraband). 
Fundamental questions regarding the status of the conflict and the 
legality of prize action taken in reliance thereon were answered in the 
celebrated Prize Cases. 22 The Supreme Court held that the President did 
not need congressional approval to institute a blockade of the states then 
in rebellion and that the property of those residing or domiciled therein, 
although belonging to American citizens, was a proper subject of capture 
and condemnation in prize.23 The Court found that the conflict was a 
"war" for purposes of international law and that the existence of a state 
of war permitted the Union to avail itself of belligerent rights. No decla-
ration of war was necessary; the President's assessment of the situation 
and his action thereon was sufficient.24 This decision announced princi-
ples of executive power that are important even today, and is notable for 
its treatment of international law as a dynamic, flexible instrument con-
cerned with the reality of affairs and not trammeled by categories of mu-
nicipal legislation. 
The contraband question was treated in The PeterhoJ:P5 in a manner 
that survived until World War I. Essentially, items classified as contra-
band (most notably munitions and arms, but other things as well) could 
be seized and condemned from neutral vessels if it were shown that the 
items were intended for belligerent use; an overt attempt to run the 
21. [d. at 20-21. 
22. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
23. [d. at 665-74. 
24. [d. at 669-71. 
25. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 28 (1867). 
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blockade was not necessary. Noncontraband, however, could be seized 
only if a breach of the blockade was intended.26 In a tangential line of 
prize cases,27 the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of "continuous 
voyage" to condemn both cargoes and ships. "Continuous voyage," an 
English doctrine, meant that a neutral ship carrying contraband was 
good prize if captured on the high seas during a voyage between two 
neutral ports, provided the voyage would ultimately end with delivery of 
the contraband to a belligerent. In The Bermuda,28 the leading continu-
ous voyage case, the Court relied substantially on English law to buttress 
its departure from the traditional American solicitude for neutral 
rights. 29 Interestingly, the Union's naval position in relation to the Con-
federate property was analogous to the British position with regard to 
American property during the War of 1812, when American policy had 
opposed "continuous voyage" and other manifestations of British 
power. 30 
The vexing question regarding the status of the property of Confed-
erate domiciliaries as prize, answered generally in the Prize Cases,31 was 
given a closer analysis in The Grey Jacket. 32 In that case, the issue was 
whether the property of a Confederate domiciliary who claimed to have 
remained loyal to the Union could be condemned as prize. The Court, in 
a rather stringent opinion, held that domicile was dispositive of the en-
emy character of the property. A lone exception was provided for loyal 
persons who, upon the outbreak of hostilities, had escaped with what 
possessions they could transport. This principle, which also was applied 
to Army seizures of property on land,33 would playa significant role in 
the government's case in The Paquete Habana. 
Thus, by 1865 a significant body of American prize law had devel-
oped as the result of two separate conflicts that presented disparate chal-
lenges to American naval policy. Much of the law, particularly that 
produced by the War of 1812, was built upon British principles of com-
ity. In later prize cases arising out of the Civil War,34 however, Ameri-
can jurists took a rather pragmatic and even teleological view of 
international law as a body of jurisprudence capable of growth through 
changes in accepted international custom. 
With regard to the development of international law, another case, 
26. Id. at 55-62. 
27. The Springbok, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 1 (1867); The Bermuda, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 514 
(1866); The Hart, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 559 (1866). 
28. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 514 (1866). 
29. Id. at 554-58. 
30. A residual concern for neutral rights can be seen in The Springbok, 72 U.S. (5 
Wall.) 1 (1867), where the Court, upholding the condemnation of the cargo, re-
versed condemnation of the vessel on the ground that the master believed in good 
faith that he was making a legitimate voyage from London to Nassau. 
31. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
32. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 342 (1867). 
33. Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 404 (1865). 
34. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
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The Scotia,35 must be briefly mentioned. This was not a prize case, but 
one in admiralty, arising from a collision between American and British 
ships. The question was whether certain nautical "rules of the road," 
adopted in Britain by Orders in Council in 1863 and in the United States 
by an Act of Congress in 1864,36 were applicable to an international colli-
sion on the high seas. In finding the rules applicable, the Court refused 
to limit the municipal laws to each nation's vessels, and held that the 
"common consent of civilized communities" - the adoption of the same 
rules by thirty nations within a few years of Britain's action - had made 
the rules part of customary international law. As such, the rules were 
obligatory on nations and their vessels. 37 This recognition of accepted 
international custom as making new, binding international law without 
any formal international agreement was clearly a doctrine with a poten-
tial for significant development, and one that would be of great impor-
tance to The Paquete Habana. 
Although the United States was not directly involved, multilateral 
developments in the law of naval warfare occurred during the nineteenth 
century. The developments were indicative of a growing feeling among 
nations and among jurists that amelioration of the conditions of warfare 
was possible. This gradual development of law is one of the touchstones 
of The Paquete Habana. 
The most notable multilateral treaty dealing with naval warfare in 
the nineteenth century was the Declaration of Paris in 1856, which abol-
ished privateering and enunciated certain principles that reduced the per-
missible limits of capture.38 The United States did not adhere to the 
Declaration. In fact, during the Civil War,39 the Confederacy actually 
issued letters of marque and reprisal and engaged in privateering.40 A 
notable effort to produce a codification of prize law, which included the 
introduction of an international prize court, was made by the Institute of 
International Law in the 1880's. In three sessions, at Turin in 1882, Mu-
nich in 1883, and Heidelberg in 1887, the Institute produced a lengthy 
model prize code. Article 110 of the code prohibited the seizure as prize 
of a broad variety of vessels, including fishing vessels, and privately 
owned cargo, unless a prize court determined that a particular vessel had 
violated the code.41 Acts that constituted violations of the code were set 
out in Article 112 and included breach of blockade, resistance to stop-
35. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 (1872). 
36. Act of Apr. 29, 1864, ch. 69, 13 Stat. 58 (amended by Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 100, 
§ 47, 16 Stat. 453). 
37. The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187-88 (1872). 
38. F. PIGGOTT, THE DECLARATION OF PARIS 1856, at 179-80 (1919). 
39. Id. at 142. 
40. See W. ROBINSON, THE CONFEDERATE PRIVATEERS (1928). The threat of Con fed-
erate privateering provoked a belated but abortive American offer to adhere to the 
Declaration. See also A. NEVINS, THE IMPROVISED WAR 1861-1862 in 5 THE 
ORDEAL OF THE UNION 208 (1959); F. PIGGOTT, supra note 38, at 154-61. 
41. J. SCOTT, RESOLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW DEALING 
WITH THE LAW OF NATIONS 75-76 (1916). 
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ping or search, and participation in hostilities.42 Although these regula-
tions, if adopted, would have drastically cut back the ambit of prize law, 
the proposed substantive limits on capture apparently provoked little dis-
sent. Instead, disagreement over the jurisdiction and composition of the 
proposed international court precluded adoption of this code.43 
The effort to codify international prize law was part of a larger 
movement, which included the Declaration of Paris. The movement was 
undertaken to purge the practice of warfare of methods that were 
deemed to be barbaric relics, among which was the opportunity for turn-
ing a private profit out of the public act of naval warfare. By 1895, an 
English international lawyer, although noting that the exemption of fish-
ing boats from capture was a somewhat debatable point as a matter of 
law, opined that no civilized belligerent would now capture the boats of 
fishermen plying their avocation peaceably in the territorial waters of 
their own state.44 This proposition was shortly put to the test when two 
"civilized belligerents," the United States and Spain, went to war. 
III. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 
Examination of American political and naval policy and strategy is 
essential to an understanding of the facts in The Paquete Habana. After 
the sinking of the battleship U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbor on February 
15, 1898, American public opinion, already inflamed by overheated press 
coverage of Cuban events, turned strongly toward a stern policy, includ-
ing war if necessary, with Spain. Spain had made substantial concessions 
and, being wretchedly unprepared, was anxious to avoid war.4S John 
Davis Long, President McKinley's Navy Secretary, wrote in his diary on 
April 5, 1898, "the country is so clamorous for action that the President 
cannot delay 10nger,"46 and the day after he stated, "[t]he members of 
the House and Senate. . . are violently pressed by their constituents for 
some positive action."47 
President McKinley's message to Congress of April 11, 1898, barely 
mentioned Spanish efforts at compromise and essentially gave Congress 
carte blanche to deal with the affair.48 Congress responded on April 20, 
1898, with a joint resolution so truculent and bellicose that Spain had no 
choice but to declare war. The joint resolution demanded that Spain at 
42. [d. at 76. 
43. REGLEMENT INTERNATIONAL DES PRISES MARITIMES: PROJET ADOPTE PAR 
L'INSTITUTE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 7-11 (1888). 
44. T. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 383 (1895); see also W. 
HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 381-83 (1880). 
45. 1 F. CHADWICK, THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN: THE 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 33-46, 51-54, 94-126 (1911); D. TRASK, THE WAR WITH 
SPAIN IN 1898 11-29 (1981). 
46. J. LONG, AMERICA OF YESTERDAY 176 (1923). 
47. [d. at 177. 
48. S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 118 (rev. ed. 
1972). 
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once relinquish its authority and withdraw from Cuba and its waters and 
authorized the President to use the military forces of the United States to 
carry out the Congressional mandate.49 Spain promptly severed diplo-
matic relations with the United States, and on April 22, 1898, President 
McKinley proclaimed a blockade of Cuban ports. Secretary Long, who 
had no illusions as to what this portended, recorded on April 21, 1898: 
"One of the busiest days of the season. Appoint Captain Sampson as 
Acting Admiral. Telegraph him to move at once to blockade Cuba, 
which, of course, is the beginning of war."50 
American naval strategy in the event of a war with Spain had been 
under consideration for some months. A vital element in that strategy 
was a close naval blockade of Cuba, or as much of its coastline as Ameri-
can naval forces could patrol. Strategists believed the blockade would 
starve the Spanish army quartered in Cuba into submission without a 
fight, because the Cuban insurrection that precipitated the conflict had 
reduced available food supplies. The fear that American land forces 
would be decimated by tropical disease also encouraged implementation 
of this tactic. Furthermore, the blockade was expected to destroy Span-
ish West Indian commerce and was intended to place a significant logisti-
cal burden on Spain by forcing her to succor Cuba from a distance of 
3,000 miles. 51 
The blockade strategy also evidenced a respect for the Spanish 
armed forces that was not always borne out by the performance of Span-
ish troops in combat. Captain (later Rear Admiral) William T. Samp-
son, who was to command the blockading squadron, favored an 
immediate naval attack on Havana. The Navy Department overruled 
this, fearing that too many American ships would be damaged and ren-
dered unavailable for battle with the Spanish Navy. The blockade was 
viewed as a safer alternative that would reduce Spanish land forces with-
out risking American ships against the shore batteries of Havana. 52 
The original blockade instructions from Secretary Long to Admiral 
Sampson, dated April 6, 1898, provided for a blockade of most of the 
Cuban coast: 
The Department further desires that, in case of war, you 
will maintain a strict blockade of Cuba, particularly at the 
ports of Havana, Matanzas, and, if possible, of Santiago de 
Cuba, Manzanillo, and Cienfuegos. Such a blockade may cause 
the Spaniards to yield before the rainy season is over. . . . All 
prizes should be sent to Key West or other available U.S. ports 
for adjudication. 53 
49. S. Con. Res. 24, 30 Stat. 738-39 (1898). 
50. J. LONG, THE JOURNAL OF JOHN DAVIS LONG 223 (1956). 
51. J. LONG, THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 228-29 (1979). 
52. [d. at 231. 
53. Annual Report o/the Navy Department/or the Year 1898: Appendix to the Report 0/ 
10 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 15 
This was an ambitious plan. During the next two weeks, however, as war 
approached, it became increasingly apparent that the naval force at Rear 
Admiral Sampson's disposal would be insufficient for such a task, espe-
cially because a portion of the American fleet had to be kept in readiness 
to deal with a Spanish squadron then in the Cape Verde Islands. Obvi-
ously, these vessels could not be tied down with blockade duty.54 Thus, 
when the order to impose the blockade came, it was significantly more 
limited: 
The Department's instructions of April 6 are modified as 
follows: You will immediately institute a blockade of the north 
coast of Cuba, extending from Cardenas on the east to Bahia 
Honda on the west; also, if in your opinion your force warrants, 
the port of Cienfuegos on the south side of the island. 55 
President McKinley's proclamation of blockade was issued on April 
22, 1898. After reciting its terms, the demands of the United States, and 
the authority of Congress's joint resolution, the proclamation stated that 
a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including ports on the coast be-
tween Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and of Cienfuegos on the south coast, 
would be maintained "in pursuance of the laws of the United States and 
the laws of nations applicable to such cases."56 Neutral vessels ap-
proaching these ports or attempting to leave them in ignorance of the 
blockade would be stopped and warned, and indorsements made of the 
warnings on their logs. Such vessels twice attempting to enter would be 
captured and sent in for adjudication as prize. Thirty days' grace was 
given neutral vessels to leave Cuban portsY The proclamation was a 
formal notice to neutral nations of the blockade, as was required then by 
international law; however, it contained no mention of Spanish vessels. 
War was formally declared by an Act of Congress on April 25, 1898, 
retroactive to April 21, 1898.58 On the following day, President McKin-
ley issued a proclamation declaring the rules under which the United 
States proposed to conduct the naval war. 59 This document eschewed 
any resort to privateering, stating that the United States would adhere to 
the Declaration of Paris.60 It further proclaimed, in accord with the 
Declaration of Paris, that enemy goods under neutral flags, except for 
contraband, would be protected; that neutral goods, not contraband, 
the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation 171 (1898) [hereinafter cited as Navy Report 
Appendix]. 
54. J. LONG, supra note 50, at 232-34, 237. 
55. Letter from Secretary Long to Rear Admiral Sampson, (Apr. 21, 1898), in Navy 
Report Appendix, supra note 53, at 175. 
56. Proclamation of Apr. 22, 1898, in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1898, at 769 (1901) [hereinafter cited as FOREIGN 
RELATIONS]. 
57. !d. at 769-70. 
58. Act of Apr. 25, 1898, ch. 189, 30 Stat. 364 (1898). 
59. Proclamation of Apr. 26, 1898, in FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 56, at 772-73. 
60. !d. at 772. 
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under the Spanish flag would not be confiscated; and that the blockade, 
in order to be binding on vessels attempting to enter or leave Cuba, must 
be maintained by a sufficient number of ships.61 Spanish ships in Ameri-
can ports were given thirty days' grace to leave. Spanish ships bound for 
the United States prior to April 21, 1898, would not be molested. The 
right of search was "to be exercised with strict regard for the rights of 
neutrals,"62 and mail steamers were not to be interfered with "except on 
the clearest grounds of suspicion. "63 The proclamation, in a phrase 
which also became a part of The Paquete Habana litigation, stated that 
the war "should be conducted upon principles in harmony with the pres-
ent views of nations and sanctioned by their recent practice."64 The 
proclamation, however, provided no exceptions from capture for any 
class of Spanish ships, other than the thirty days of grace. 
President McKinley's proclamation represented an amelioration of 
the stringent interdiction of trade that marked American prize cases in 
the Civil War, particularly the substantial restraints on neutral rights 
practiced during that war to restrain trade with the Confederacy.65 The 
1898 proclamation was in some sense a return to earlier American solici-
tude for neutral rights. International law, as developed in the later nine-
teenth century, exerted only a marginal influence on the promulgation of 
President McKinley's proclamation. A far more significant influence 
was McKinley's desire to mollify the European nations, a number of 
whom looked askance at the American declaration of war.66 
Spain, by Royal Decree of April 23, 1898, issued a proclamation 
analogous to President McKinley's. The Spanish proclamation differed 
from its American counterpart in three important respects: Spain re-
served the right to commission privateers and issue letters of marque, 
although it stated that for the moment it would restrict itself to commis-
sioning merchant vessels as auxiliary naval cruisers; the proclamation 
contained an open-ended list of contraband items; and the proclamation 
contained a provision evidently directed at potential American use of 
vessels manned by Cuban insurgents, which stated that captains and of-
ficers of non-American vessels, or of vessels manned by more than one-
third non-Americans, who were captured while engaged in war against 
Spain, would be treated as pirates.67 




64. Id. On the same day, Representative Gillett of Massachusetts introduced, with Ad-
ministration support, a resolution that no privateers be commissioned by the United 
States, and that Spanish vessels be exempt from capture, except for those bearing 
contraband or breaching the blockade. New York Commercial, Apr. 26, 1898, at 1, 
col. 4. 
65. See The Bermuda, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 514 (1866). 
66. S. MORISON, supra note 48, at 119-20; J. LONG, supra note 51, at 233. 
67. FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 56, at 774-75. 
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garding the exercise of the right to visit,68 which contained substantial 
citations of the 1864 and 1868 Geneva Conventions relating to hospital 
ships and the treatment of wounded and sick combatants.69 The United 
States, however, did not issue instructions to its blockading fleet until 
June 11, 1898.70 The American instructions elaborated on the proclama-
tion on April 26, 1898, without any significant departures from generally 
accepted principles of international law. In carrying out the policy of not 
offending neutral European nations, the instructions cautioned that "the 
crews of blockade runners are not enemies and should be treated not as 
prisoners of war, but with every consideration."71 Other than the days of 
grace allowed in the April 26, 1898, proclamation, no exemptions from 
capture for Spanish vessels were provided, and the instructions did not 
mention immunity for fishing vessels. Detailed instructions were given 
on the bringing in of prizes for adjudication. The substantial amount of 
space devoted to prize adjudication in the American proclamation clearly 
demonstrated that the United States, although anxious not to offend Eu-
ropean neutrals, nevertheless intended to carryon vigorous warfare 
against Spanish commerce. 
Notwithstanding the insufficiency of American naval forces, a 
blockade was fixed around ports on the north coast of Cuba and was in 
place when war was declared. Within a day or two of the blockade's 
inception, a new problem presented itself to Rear Admiral Sampson and 
Secretary Long, one which seemingly had not been considered during the 
hasty and improvised blockade planning. This was the problem of 
whether Cuban fishing vessels, most of which were small coastal craft, 
should be seized. A number of these vessels had been taken in the first 
days of the war. On April 28, 1898, Rear Admiral Sampson wrote to 
Secretary Long concerning the problem: 
I find that a large number of fishing schooners are attempt-
ing to get into Havana from their fishing grounds near the Flor-
ida reefs and coasts. They are generally manned by excellent 
seamen, belonging to the maritime inscription of Spain, who 
have already served in the Spanish navy, and who are liable to 
further service. As these trained men are naval reserve, have a 
semi-military character, and would be most valuable to the 
Spaniards as artillerymen, either afloat or ashore, I recommend 
68. The "right of visit" is the right of a warship to stop a suspicious vessel and send an 
officer aboard to ascertain the vessel's nationality. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1409 
(5th ed. 1979). 
69. FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 56, at 775-79. 
70. /d. at 780. 
71. [d. at 781. One instruction deserves mention in view of later American actions: it 
authorized the destruction of vessels taken as prize only if they could not be sent in, 
or appraised and sold on the spot. This was to be done only in the case of "control-
ling reasons," such as unseaworthiness or lack of a prize crew. In any such case, 
the papers were to be preserved and sent to the prize court for adjudication. [d. at 
782. 
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that they should be detained prisoners of war, and that I should 
be authorized to deliver them to the commanding officer of the 
army at Key West. 72 
13 
Secretary Long, who contemporaneously had received a letter from a 
Boston friend with information of a petition calling for immunity of all 
Spanish private property,73 replied, "Spanish fishing vessels attempting 
to violate [the] blockade are subject, with crew, to capture, and any such 
vessel or crew considered likely to aid enemy may be detained. "74 
This exchange, important to blockade policy and The Paquete Ra-
bana case, warrants analysis. Evidently, Rear Admiral Sampson be-
lieved there were some limits, however inchoate, on the capture of fishing 
vessels. The fishing vessels were under the Spanish flag and did not fall 
within the days of grace exemption in President McKinley's proclama-
tion. Therefore, any exemption for them would have to be based on in-
ternational custom, not on American instructions. Moreover, Sampson's 
request seems to have been tacitly limited to crewmen who might reason-
ably have been expected to take part in hostilities, although there was no 
indication that any of them had done so. An argument of military neces-
sity would have been on stronger ground with such naval reservists 
rather than with the general run of fishermen; indeed, reservists might 
have been denominated combatants per se and, as such, not entitled to an 
exemption. Secretary Long's reply was broader than Rear Admiral 
Sampson's question; the reply covered all Spanish fishermen attempting 
to violate the blockade and imposed only the very broad criterion of 
whether the fishermen were "likely" to aid the enemy. This gave the 
blockading forces a great deal of discretion, because virtually anything, 
including fish, a staple food, could aid a blockaded enemy. It appears 
that the Secretary was less concerned with questions of international cus-
tom in this area than with maintaining an effective blockade, although he 
may have gained the impression from Rear Admiral Sampson that the 
only persons fishing in the West Indies were Spanish naval reservists. In 
any event, the question of the immunity from capture of small fishing 
vessels evidently was not considered during the planning of the American 
blockade. 75 
72. Letter from Rear Admiral Sampson to Secretary Long (Apr. 28, 1898) in Navy 
Report Appendix, supra note 53, at 178. 
73. The friend was the noted Henry Lee Higginson, who wrote Secretary Long that "[a] 
petition to the President that 'seizures upon the seas of private properties of 
Spaniards be prohibited' is brought to me for circulation," and asked Long what he 
should do with the petition. Such a prohibition would certainly have covered the 
cargoes of the Paquete Habana and Lola, and would seem to have covered even 
privately owned contraband. There is no record of Secretary Long's reply. Letter of 
H.L. Higginson to Secretary Long (Apr. 28, 1898) in J. LONG, THE PAPERS OF 
JOHN DAVIS LONG, 1897-1904 at 107-08 (1939). 
74. Letter from Secretary Long to Rear Admiral Sampson (Apr. 30, 1898) in Navy 
Report Appendix, supra note 53, at 178. 
75. The question initially arose in a message from a combat commander at the outset of 
war, but in a muddied fashion that did not clearly present the basic immunity ques-
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Nonetheless, the fishing vessel immunity question ultimately pro-
vided the basis for The Paquete Habana. Two of the fishing vessels men-
tioned by Rear Admiral Sampson in his letters to Secretary Long were 
the Paquete Habana and the Lola. Both vessels were captured in the 
very first days of war. Even as Secretary Long replied to the Admiral, 
these vessels already were in Key West, beginning their trek into legal 
history. 
IV. PAQUETE HABANA AND LOLA 
A. The Facts 
The Paquete Habana was a sloop, forty-three feet long, displacing 
twenty-five tons. She was owned by Justa Galban, a woman of Spanish 
descent living in Havana, and captained by Juan Pasos, also a Cuban of 
Spanish descent. In addition to Pasos she carried a crew of three men. 
Neither Pasos nor the ship had any commission, both had only a license 
from the Spanish government to fish.76 The ship left Havana on March 
25, 1898, and proceeded to Cape San Antonio, where the crew fished for 
twenty-five days before sailing back to Havana with a cargo of forty quin-
tals, or about 8,800 pounds, of live fish.77 
Out on the sea, the ship and its crew were isolated from society and 
world affairs. By the time the fishermen began their return journey, the 
blockade of the northern coast of Cuba was in effect. On April 25, 1898 
- the first day of the war - the Paquete Habana was captured off 
Mariel, near Havana, by the gunboat U.S.S. Castine. 78 It was undisputed 
tion. See supra text accompanying note 72. The treatment of fishing vessels was not 
clarified prior to the end of the war. On June 25, 1898, the warship U.S.S. Yankee 
captured five small vessels off the Isle of Pines. Upon learning that they were "fish-
ing for the Havana market," the captain of the Yankee ordered their destruction, "it 
being impractical to take these small vessels to Key West." Letter from Commander 
W. H. Brownson to Rear Admiral Sampson (June 27, 1898) in Navy Report Appen-
dix, supra note 53, at 218. Arguably, this violated Sampson's instructions of June 
11, 1898, which permitted destruction only if "controlling reasons" were present, 
and if the ship could not be appraised and sold on the spot. See supra note 71. The 
likely reason for the destruction was the lack of a prize crew. Commanders in the 
blockading fleet complained of the lack of ships and the difficulty of interdicting 
coastal commerce with heavy-draft seagoing vessels. See Letter from Commander 
W.H. Brownson to Rear Admiral Sampson (June 27, 1898) in Navy Report Appen-
dix, supra note 53, at 218; Letters from Commodore J.A. Howell to Rear Admiral 
Sampson (July 17 & 27, 1898) and to Secretary Long (July 27, 1898) in Navy Report 
Appendix, supra note 53, at 256-60; Letter from Commander Richardson Clover, 
U.S.S. Bancroft, to Rear Admiral Sampson (Aug. 9, 1898) in Navy Report Appendix, 
supra note 52, at 289-92. Although the blockade had some economic effect upon 
the poorer classes of Havana, it did not starve the Spanish army into submission; 
United States forces had to fight several sharp land actions to defeat the Spaniards. 
J. LONG, supra note 51, at 234-36. 
76. Deposition of Juan Pasos at 10, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
77. Affidavit of Juan Pasos, at 14, The Paquete Habana. 
78. Appeal at 3-4, The Paquete Habana; Annual Report of the Navy Department for the 
Year 1898 at 331 [hereinafter cited as Navy Dept. Report]. The U.S.S. Castine had 
left Key West on April 21, 1898, for blockade duty and returned on May 3, 1898. 
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that, at the time of the capture, the crew of the Paquete Habana knew 
nothing of the blockade or the war. The humble nature of the mariners 
involved was evident by the size of the ship and crew, the crews' wages of 
a share of the catch rather than money, and the reply of Captain Pasos 
when asked whether he had written anything down about the capture. 
His reply was, "I cannot write much."79 Although the crew was igno-
rant of the blockade and the ship was not suited for naval combat, both 
crew and vessel immediately were taken to Key West for adjudication. 
On April 27, 1898, a libel was filed against the vessel by the United States 
Attorney for the Southern District of Florida. 80 
The Lola was a larger ship than the Paquete Habana, and was re-
turning from a longer journey when she ran afoul of the blockade. She 
was a two-masted schooner, fifty-one feet long, displacing thirty-five 
tons, owned by Severo Gonzales, a Cuban born in Spain. She was 
captained by Tomas Betancourt, a Spanish subject living in Havana. In 
addition to Betancourt, the Lola carried a crew of five. Neither 
Betancourt nor the ship had any license or commission.81 The Lola de-
parted Havana on April 11, 1898, eleven days prior to President McKin-
ley's proclamation of the blockade, and proceeded to Campeche Sound, 
off the coast of Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula. After taking in some 
10,000 pounds of live fish in eight days, the Lola set course for Havana.82 
On April 26, 1898, the Lola was stopped near Havana by the U.S.S. 
Cincinnati.83 Upon learning the Lola knew nothing of either the block-
ade or the war, the Cincinnati warned her not to try entering Havana; 
instead, Betancourt was told he could land at Bahia Honda, a smaller 
Cuban port. The Lola accordingly changed course for the latter port. 84 
The next morning, off Bahia Honda, she was captured by the unarmored 
cruiser U.S.S. Dolphin.85 She, like the Paquete Habana, was taken into 
Key West and libeled as a prize. 
As the nearest American port to the Cuban blockade, and the seat of 
Navy Dept. Report at 331. Although she was a giant compared to the Paquete Ha-
bana, being 204 feet long, displacing 1,177 tons, and armed with eight four-inch 
rifles and four six-pounders, she illustrated the motley, improvised nature of the 
blockading fleet. Deficient in stability as originally designed, she had been altered to 
take a lighter armament. A contemporary nonetheless described her as a "single-
screw vessel, weak and unsatisfactory." 2 U.S. NAVY, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN 
NAVAL FIGHTING SHIPS 50 (1963); H. WILSON, THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN 53 
(1900). 
79. Affidavit of Juan Pasos at 11, The Paquete Habana. 
80. Appeal at 3-4, The Paquete Habana. 
81. Deposition of Tomas Betancourt at 9, The Paquete Habana. 
82. [d. at 10. 
83. Navy Dept. Report, supra note 78, at 332. 
84. Deposition of Tomas Betancourt at 10-11, The Paquete Habana. 
85. [d. at 3-4. The U.S.S. Dolphin was larger than the U.S.S. Castine, displacing 1,486 
tons and being 256 feet long. She was, however, also lightly armed (two four-inch 
guns and five three-pounders) and her lack of real fighting power is evident from her 
subsequent service to the Secretaries of the Navy as a yacht. 2 U.S. NAVY, DIC-
TIONARY OF AMERICAN NAVAL FIGHTING SHIPS 285 (1963). 
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a United States District Court, Key West was the center of prize adjudi-
cation throughout the war. One observer wrote, "Key West harbor at 
this time was full of shipping. The masts of the Spanish prizes rose like a 
forest. "86 Thus, it was not surprising that the Paquete Habana and the 
Lola had to wait some weeks for a hearing. 
The cases came before District Court Judge James W. Locke87 on 
May 23, 1898, and decrees of condemnation were entered, evidently by 
default. The masters of these ships, speaking little English, untrained in 
law, not represented by counsel, and in the midst of a foreign proceeding, 
did little in their own defense. Fortunately, Joseph Parker Kirlin entered 
the case as counsel for the Paquete Habana and the Lola. Although it is 
not known exactly how he became involved in these cases, Kirlin was 
well on his way to legal prominence of such a degree that he was de-
scribed after his death as "the undisputed leader of the Admiralty 
Bar."s8 
Kirlin entered the litigation sometime between May 23, 1898, when 
the decrees of condemnation were entered, and May 28, 1898. On the 
latter date Judge Locke entertained motions from him in both cases, ask-
ing that the decrees affecting both the Paquete Habana and the Lola be 
vacated on the basis that, under general law and the presidential procla-
mation of April 26, 1898, the fishing boats were not lawful prize. 89 Judge 
Locke denied the motions in decrees of May 30, 1898, stating that the 
court, "not being satisfied that as a matter of law, without any ordinance, 
treaty, or proclamation, fishing vessels of this class are exempt from 
seizure,"9o ordered condemnation, forfeiture, and sale of the vessels and 
cargo.91 
86. W. GOODE, WITH SAMPSON THROUGH THE WAR 53 (1899). 
87. Judge Locke (1837-1922), who had been the District Judge for the Southern District 
of Florida at Key West since 1872, had an interesting career. Born in Vermont, he 
enlisted in the navy as a paymaster's clerk in 1861, and was mustered out at Key 
West in 1865. Evidently liking Key West, he stayed there to practice law, and served 
as a county judge and in the Reconstruction legislature before President Grant ap-
pointed him to the federal bench. This carpetbag Republican far outlasted Recon-
struction, serving as District Judge for 40 years until his resignation in 1912. 
Obituary, New York Times, Sept. 7, 1922, at 17. 
88. Maritime Law Association of the United States, Annual Meetings 1932-39, Appen-
dix II, Annual Report of the Secretary 1608 (May 11, 1928); see also J. WOOLSEY, 
T. JONES, & C. CLARK, MEMORIAL OF JOSEPH PARKER KIRLIN, 1861-1927 (1928). 
Kirlin was educated at the University of Virginia and Columbia Law School. He 
probably reached the apogee of his legal prominence in the decade 1910-1920, when 
he represented the White Star Line after the sinking of the Titanic, see The Titanic, 
209 F. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); Cunard after the sinking of the Lusitania, see The 
Lusitiana, 251 F. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); and the Guaranty Trust Company in The 
Kronprinzessin Cecilie, see The Kronprinzessin Cecilie v. Guaranty Trust Co., 244 
U.S. 12 (1917), and served as General Counsel for the Shipping Control Committee 
during World War I. 
89. Record at 13, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Record at 12-14, The 
Lola, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
90. Record at 15, The Paquete Habana; Record at 14, The Lola. 
91. Record at 15, The Paquete Habana; Record at 14, The Lola. American prize stat-
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Although the record of the argument and holding is quite sketchy, 
the basic issues that would concern the Supreme Court had been aired 
during the argument over this motion. The basic issues were: whether 
the present state of international law exempted fishing vessels from cap-
ture; whether a United States court could take cognizance of interna-
tional law in the absence of a treaty or statute; and whether the 
exemption of fishing vessels was established in internationallaw.92 
Thereafter, the vessels disappear. They were auctioned, apparently 
in July or August of 1898, by United States Marshal John F. Horr. The 
Paquete Habana brought $490 and the Lola $800.93 On August 15, 
1899, Kirlin filed appeals in both cases with the Supreme Court.94 The 
two cases were consolidated; only one set of briefs and arguments, and 
one record, appear from that date forward. 
B. The Argument 
Kirlin, in his appeal, made four assignments of error by the district 
court. The first was a basic point of international law: The fishing ves-
sels were not subject to condemnation as lawful prize. The second point 
utes in 1898 had not changed a great deal in a century. The original statute of 1800, 
Act of April 23, 1800, §§ 6-7,2 Stat. 45, overhauled during the Civil War, Act of 
June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. 306, established a complex pyramid of fractional shares, in 
which proportions officers and crew shared in the proceeds from the condemnation 
and sale of prizes. The United States Treasury Department took half if the prize 
was of inferior force to the captor, as in The Paquete Habana; if an American war-
ship captured an enemy prize of superior force, the Treasury took nothing. F. 
UPTON, THE LA W OF NATIONS AFFECTING COMMERCE DURING WAR 484 (1863). 
In addition to the proceeds of sale, captors could in 1898 receive bounty or prize 
money. These were statutory allotments from the Treasury, bounty being based 
upon the number of enemy sailors and the superior/inferior force idea, and prize 
money upon the value of the captured ship. Neither was involved in The Paquete 
Habana, and both were abolished in 1899. Knauth, Prize Law Reconsidered, 46 
COLUM. L. REV. 69, 70-71 (1946); see J. STORY, NOTES ON THE PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE OF PRIZE COURTS (F. Pratt ed. 1854). 
92. Record at 15, The Paquete Habana; Record at 16, The Lola. 
93. Record at 16, The Paquete Habana; Record at 14-15, The Lola. The fish were not 
sold, there evidently being no market for them at Key West; instead they were eaten 
by the crews of the smacks and revenue cutters or were thrown away. 
94. Record at 20-22, The Paquete Habana; Record at 16-17, The Lola. It is reasonable 
to inquire what could motivate an alien owner with only $490 at stake (in the case of 
Justa Gaban) to pursue protracted and expensive litigation in the highest court of a 
foreign nation. Although the value of money was much higher then, that alone does 
not answer the question. There appear to be two reasons for pursuing these cases to 
the Supreme Court. First, in capture without probable cause, the captors are liable 
for damages, costs, and expenses. J. STORY, supra note 91, at 39-43. If it were held 
that international law prohibited the capture of such vessels, the owners would re-
cover substantially more than the auction price, particularly because there was argu-
ment over the valuation of the vessels at auction. See infra notes 199-210 and 
accompanying text. Second, this was a test case for a great number of such vessels 
captured during the war. This is apparent from the fact that Kirlin, in the second 
Paquete Habana case, represented the claimants of 12 different vessels. 189 U.S. 
453 (1903). Clearly, much more was at stake in an economic sense than two smacks 
and some fish. 
18 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 15 
was based on a statement made in President McKinley's proclamation of 
April 26, 1898, that the war should be conducted in accordance with the 
recent practice of nations, which Kirlin maintained did not include 
seizure of fishing vessels. The third point was one that counsel for both 
sides would address before the Supreme Court. Kirlin claimed the joint 
resolution of April 20, 1898, had recognized Cuban independence; there-
fore, the fishing vessels were neutral, not enemy property. His final point 
embraced a technicality of admiralty practice. Kirlin claimed the district 
court had erroneously excluded evidence regarding the immunity of the 
vessels.95 
The Court also raised sua sponte a jurisdictional issue that it asked 
the parties to brief and argue. R.S. 695,96 a statute dating to the Civil 
War, permitted direct appeal to the Supreme Court in a prize case if 
$2,000 was involved or if the district court certified the question involved 
in the case as one of general importance. Neither of these criteria was 
met in The Paquete Habana. The Act of March 3, 1891,97 however, 
which established the circuit courts of appeals, stated that direct appeals 
could be taken to the Supreme Court from final decrees in prize cases. 
The Act imposed a $1,000 jurisdictional limit for Supreme Court appeals 
in "cases not hereinbefore made final." 
On October 9, 1899, Assistant Attorney General Henry M. Hoyt,98 
who argued the case for the United States, filed a brief on the issue of 
jurisdiction. Hoyt contended that the $1,000 jurisdictional limit only ap-
plied to cases made final in the circuit courts of appeals. The Paquete 
Habana had come from district court; thus the old $2,000 limit in R.S. 
695 applied. Because $2,000 was not at stake in The Paquete Habana, 
Hoyt argued that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction.99 
Hoyt also addressed two nonjurisdictional issues raised by the 
Court. First, to the question of whether the owners of the vessels were 
too wealthy to come within the class of "poor fishermen" for whom the 
exemption was available (a query which assumed the existence of some 
sort of exemption), Hoyt replied that economic status would not affect 
immunity; however, Hoyt argued that other facts identified the owners as 
members of the ruling Spanish population-not the Cuban insurgents-
and that further proof of the owners' adherence to the Cuban cause was 
improper. loo This argument adverted to Kirlin's allegation that the own-
95. Record at 20-21, The Paquete Habana; Record at 16-17, The Lola. 
96. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 174, § 11, 13 Stat. 310 (codified at R.S. § 695 (1878». 
97. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. 
98. Henry Hoyt (1856-1910) was born in Pennsylvania, the son of a Governor of that 
state. Educated at Yale and the University of Pennsylvania Law School, he served 
as Assistant Attorney General from 1897-1903, and Solicitor General from 1903-09. 
MARQUIS -WHO'S WHO, WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA, 1897-1942 at 599; New 
York Times, Nov. 21, 1910, Obituary at 9. 
99. Brief for United States on The Question of Jurisdiction at 1-5, The Paquete 
Habana. 
100. Id. at 6-7. 
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ers were neutrals. Second, in response to the question of whether a 
French cruiser, after 1778, could have made a valid prize of an American 
vessel, Hoyt noted that France had entered the Revolutionary War on 
the American side in 1778. Therefore, a French cruiser could not have 
made a valid prize of an American vessel, because the United States had 
a flag and belligerent rights that were recognized by France. 101 A French 
cruiser, however, could have made a valid prize of an American vessel 
that was flying a British flag, because the American vessel would have 
been deemed a Tory ship and thus an enemy.102 Hoyt argued that the 
circumstances of the captures at issue in The Paquete Habana were 
analogous to the hypothetical capture by a French cruiser of an Ameri-
can vessel sailing under a Tory flag. Neither the Paquete Habana nor the 
Lola flew the Cuban flag; 103 instead, both vessels regularly sailed under 
the Spanish flag. 104 Therefore, the indicia of the vessels showed their 
enemy character. lOS 
The position taken by the United States was that Cubans, by virtue 
of their status as Spanish subjects, were alien enemies and thus their ves-
sels were good prizes unless they openly adhered to the Cuban cause. 106 
The crews of vessels, out of fear of the Spanish, or for other reasons, had 
not done so. Therefore, they were enemies, and no further evidence 
should be allowed to prove otherwise. 
In his brief, Kirlin advanced four lines of argument. First, he con-
tended that international law did not sanction the capture and condem-
nation of boats exclusively engaged in coastal fishing. 107 He cited 
President McKinley's April 26, 1898, proclamation,IOS including its ad-
herence to the Declaration of Paris, as evidence that the United States 
intended to follow the principles of modern international law in waging 
the war. Although there were few judicial decisions and no American 
statutes or treaties dealing with the immunity of coastal fishing vessels, 
Kirlin argued that the actions of governments and the almost uniform 
opinions of publicists provided sufficient evidence that such immunity 
existed as a rule of international law. Kirlin cited Lord Phillimore in 
The Queen v. Keyn 109 for the proposition that the opinions of jurists are 
good evidence of what is international law. Kirlin also quoted Froissart's 
Chronicles I 10 and Henry IV's Order of 1406, III granting his protection to 
fishermen, as evidence of the rule's ancient origins. Kirlin included an 
101. Id. at 7. 
102.Id. 
103. Id. at 7. 
104. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 678 (1900). 
105. Brief for United States on The Question of Jurisdiction at 8, The Paquete Habana. 
106. Id. at 5-6. 
107. Brief for Appellants at 7, The Paquete Habana. 
108.Id. 
109. 2 Ex. D. 63, 68-70 (1876). 
110. 3 J. FROISSART, FROISSART'S CHRONIQUES 41 (1824). 
Ill. See 8 T. RYMER, RYMER'S FOEDERA 451 (1406). 
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examination of the manner in which the rule had been treated during the 
nineteenth century. The only adverse English precedent, The Young Ja-
cob and Johanna,112 was distinguished as involving spying by fishing 
boats; moreover, English Orders in Council of 1806 subsequently had 
restored the immunity. I 13 He cited the French case La Nostra Segnora 
de fa Piedad l14 to present the continental opinion that immunity for 
coastal fishing vessels was a binding rule of international law. In addi-
tion, Kirlin cited many nineteenth century writers on international law in 
order to show a consensus that the rule existed and gave examples of 
French actions in the Crimean and Franco-Prussian Wars and Japanese 
actions in the Sino-Japanese War as evidence of recent practice. I 15 He 
asserted that an exemption for fishing boats was allowed by the United 
States during the Mexican War. Kirlin also made the assertion that, prior 
to Secretary Long's April 30, 1898, letter to Rear Admiral Sampson, I 16 
instructions had been given not to harm fishing boats. Kirlin admitted, 
however, that he had no proof of this, and in view of the numerous cap-
tures at the outbreak of the war, the assertion seems somewhat dubious. 
Finally, Kirlin pointed out that the officers and crews of the vessels 
lacked knowledge of the blockade and the war and thus could not have 
intended to participate in the hostilities or aid the enemy.1I7 
Second, Kirlin argued that the Cubans had been recognized by Con-
gress and, therefore, they should have been treated either as neutrals or 
as allies. This argument, premised on language contained in the joint 
resolution, stated that the courts had no power to make determinations 
of the existence of states of war, belligerency, independence, and the like; 
these were political questions upon which the courts must defer to the 
judgment of the political branches. I IS In Kirlin's words, "[t]he recogni-
tion of the freedom and independence of a whole people must of necessity 
regard them as a state for all purposes of war, and the use of the expres-
sion the 'people of Cuba' in the joint resolution of Congress must cer-
tainly have had that effect." I 19 Kirlin also emphasized that the owners 
and mariners of the ships in question were domiciled in Cuba and hence 
were "Cubans" within the meaning of the joint resolution. 120 In making 
this argument, however, Kirlin completely ignored the principle, estab-
lished in the United States at the time of Washington's presidency, that 
recognition of a foreign state or government is the exclusive prerogative 
112. 1 C. Rob. Adm. 20 (1798). 
113. Brief for Appellants at 12-13, The Paquete Habana. 
114. 2 F. DECUSSY, CAUSES CELEBRES DU DROIT MARITIME 166 (1856). 
115. See generally Brief for Appellants at 16-33, The Paquete Habana. 
116. Letter from Secretary Long to Rear Admiral Sampson, supra note 74. 
117. Brief for Appellants at 35, The Paquete Habana. 
118. [d. at 37. 
119. [d. at 35. 
120. [d. at 48-49. 
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of the executive. 121 Because it was an action of Congress, the joint reso-
lution could have no effect upon American recognition of Cuba. Only 
President McKinley could receive envoys and recognize governments, 
and he had not done so with Cuba. The insulting demands in the joint 
resolution could provoke war, but they could not recognize Cuba. The 
government, possibly for political reasons, did not use the doctrine of 
exclusive executive perogative to refute Kirlin's argument; instead, all 
parties focused on issues of recognition/nonrecognition and enemy ver-
sus ally or neutral status. 122 
Kirlin's third argument addressed the owners' statuses as enemy or 
nonenemy in the Cuban insurrection. 123 The mere operation of the fish-
ing boats under the Spanish flag did not raise a presumption of hostility, 
he argued; instead, all situational factors such as ownership, cargo, and 
circumstances, had to be considered. 124 There was no requirement that 
the mariners invite Spanish confiscation by flying the insurgent Cuban 
flag. Because the crew had no knowledge that war had broken out and 
therefore no hostile intent, the presence of the Spanish flag was not suffi-
cient to give the ships a hostile character. 125 Moreover, prize practice at 
the outbreak of war allowed neutrals or friends to communicate with 
their vessels and remove the enemy flag, without condemnation, as long 
as laches was not present. 126 Finally, he reiterated that further proof of 
the owners' Cuban sentiments should be allowed.127 
Kirlin's fourth argument concerned the question of damages. Citing 
121. National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955); 
see United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-21 (1936). 
122. McKinley had signed the joint resolution on April 20, 1898. Although it is true that 
approved joint resolutions have the force and effect of law, see International Bhd. of 
Elec. Workers v. Washington Terminal Co., 473 F.2d 1156, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1972), 
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 906 (1973), it is quite a different matter to say that the April 
20, 1900, joint resolution recognized Cuba. Its terms were hortatory, as Hoyt was 
to point out, and the joint resolution was essentially a Congressional action ratified 
by a President who had given Congress carte blanche. Brief for the United States at 
6, The Paquete Habana. More importantly, following the joint resolution, McKin-
ley took no action consonant with recognition of Cuban independence. He did not 
send or receive envoys, or deal with a Cuban government; instead, the island simply 
exchanged an inefficient Spanish military occupation for a more efficient American 
one. Prior to the joint resolution, the United States had not recognized the Cubans 
as belligerents. See The Three Friends, 166 U.S. I (1897). Recognition of such a 
status, however, would not, of itself, have implied any recognition of a Cuban state. 
See Beale, The Recognition of Cuban Belligerency, 9 HARV. L. REV. 406, 406-07 
(1896). In fact, recognition of Cuba by the United States and other nations did not 
take place until 1902, following arrangements which allowed American intervention 
in Cuban affairs to protect American interests. PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1902, at 320-26 (1903). 
123. Brief for Appellants at 49-50, The Paquete Habana. 
124. !d. at 49. 
125. /d. at 50. 
126. /d. at 52-55 (citing the Civil War cases of The William Bagaley, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 
377 (I866) and The Grey Jacket, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 342 (I866». 
127. Brief for Appellants at 55, The Paquete Habana. 
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Justice Story, he argued that capture was at the captors' peril. 128 If there 
are no just grounds for capture, damages may be assessed against the 
captor. In The Paquete Habana, there was no probable cause for capture 
because it was widely known that fishing vessels were exempt; accord-
ingly, the captures were premature, because they had preceded notice of 
the existence of war (this was not the case in The Lola) and the ships' 
papers showed that the owners were Cubans.129 Emphasizing the hard-
ship that the captures had imposed on the owners of small vessels, Kirlin 
stated that the "fullest reparation must be made."130 
Kirlin's brief was a creditable performance. He did an excellent job 
of searching legal precedent and literature to show the status of the ex-
emption in international law. Although there were serious problems 
with his arguments based upon Cuban "nationality," Kirlin was certainly 
very thorough. As an experienced advocate in an uncertain area of law, 
he made every reasonable argument for his clients. 
The government's brief on the merits, filed by Hoyt, raised two prin-
cipal issues: whether, as a matter of general law, fishing vessels were 
exempt from capture; and whether the Cuban owners were entitled to the 
rights and privileges of neutrals. \31 Hoyt began with his strongest argu-
ment - that the crews were neither allies nor neutrals. Emphasizing 
that there was no proof the owners or the crews were in sympathy with 
the Cuban insurgents, he argued that they could not therefore be belliger-
ent allies. Nor could they be neutrals, because the taking of provisions 
into Havana was not a neutral act. 
Hoyt also attacked Kirlin's interpretation of the language of the 
joint resolution as providing for recognition of Cuba. Although Hoyt did 
not make the point that Congress qua Congress was powerless to recog-
nize Cuba, he did acknowledge its presumptuous nature: how could a 
declaration of the American Congress, "one part of which certainly was 
not in strict accordance with the existing fact, terminate violently and 
abruptly the previous national ties of another people over whom we pos-
sessed no rights and exercised no control[?]"132 Hoyt argued that Con-
gress had neither recognized Cuba nor intended to do so. He argued that 
the joint resolution was a demand on Spain and a statement of the belief 
that Cuba "ought to be" free and independent. It followed that the sta-
tus of the Cuban owners as Spanish subjects was unchanged in interna-
tional law by the joint resolution. 133 
This argument was logical and far more in accord with American 
practice than was Kirlin's insistence that Congress had recognized Cuba. 
By arguing that Congress had not intended to recognize Cuba, Hoyt 
128. The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818). 
129. Brief for Appellants at 58-59, The Paquete Habana. 
130. [d. at 59. 
131. Brief for the United States at 5, The Paquete Habana. 
132. [d. at 6. 
133. [d. 
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achieved two objectives. First, he avoided branding Congress with at-
tempting an unconstitutional act and avoided criticism, as a McKinley 
administration official, of congressional action the administration had in-
vited the previous year. Second, he refuted the contention that the 
Cubans, who were not recognized by the Executive, were neutrals or 
allies. 
Hoyt cited a number of Civil War cases, notably the Prize Cases 134 
and Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, \35 for the proposition that all persons who 
reside in enemy territory and do not remove themselves on the outbreak 
of war are enemies and will be treated as such, without inquiries into 
individual sentiments. Because Cuba was not independent, it continued 
to be Spanish and, therefore, enemy territory. Hence, the Cuban owners 
of the vessels were alien enemies. 136 Finally, Hoyt argued that the lan-
guage of President McKinley's April 26, 1898, proclamation did not 
change United States policy; references in the proclamation to modern 
practice in international law related to the specific subjects that followed, 
the "days of grace" and the Declaration of Paris. I37 
Hoyt's second contention addressed the primary question of 
whether an exemption for fishing vessels existed in international law. He 
began by admitting that some exemption existed. He posited that the 
exemption existed for humanitarian reasons, or because of the insignifi-
cance of the property involved.138 Hence, the fishing vessels at issue did 
not fall within the ambit of the exception because they were relatively 
large vessels capable of remaining at sea for some time. Moreover, Hoyt 
argued that when two warring nations are essentially contiguous, as are 
Britain and France, such small boats will frequently be in the area of 
operations, and humanity would dictate an exemption. When the com-
batants are widely separated, however, practical considerations stand in 
the way of taking such small vessels in for adjudication. 139 Because the 
United States and Cuba are essentially contiguous, and a prize court lo-
cated in Key West was functioning, it is difficult to see what Hoyt hoped 
to achieve with these contentions. 
Hoyt then contrasted continental practice, which regarded the ex-
emption as "tolerably well-fixed," with English practice, which regarded 
the exemption as discretionary and requiring executive or treaty ac-
tion.140 Hoyt argued the United States followed the English practice and 
no ordinance or treaty existed to bind the United States to a practice that 
exempted fishing vessels from capture. Returning to the question of ves-
sel size, Hoyt claimed that the vessels were too large to come within the 
134. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
135. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 404 (1865). 
136. Brief for the United States at 6-9, The Paquete Habana. 
137. Id. at 9. 
138. Id. at 9-10. 
139.Id. 
140. Id. at 11. 
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exemption, and he argued that the development of deep-sea fishing had 
negated the reason for the exemption. 141 This curious argument ignored 
not only the obvious existence of the coastal fishermen whose status was 
at issue, but also Kirlin's assertion that there was a growing international 
consensus in favor of the exemption. 142 
Hoyt cited The Young Jacob and Johanna 143 to emphasize the Eng-
lish view that the exemption was one of comity only, which required 
positive executive action for its implementation. He attempted to refute 
Kirlin's extensive list of jurists and publicists who supported the rule by 
portraying them as mere theorists: 
[I]t must be remembered that the writers on international 
law - and especially the Continental writers on international 
law - are far in advance of legislation, as well as of decisions of 
the courts; that while the English law writers are more sober in 
their statements, and have greater regard for the rights of bel-
ligerents, even they do not express the English law as it is, but 
rather as they conceive it ought to be; and that in looking to 
any foreign rule for our guidance, we properly regard, where 
our own practice and law are silent on the question, the deci-
sions of the English courts, and not the speculations of writers 
on international law, either English or Continental. 144 
This statement, betraying a masked discomfort with any "law" that 
was not positive legislation, exhibited a common lawyer's puzzlement 
over the place of the writings of jurists and publicists in the international 
law system. More immediately it showed a basic misunderstanding of 
Kirlin's strategy. Kirlin had not attempted to ventilate advanced aca-
demic opinion; instead, he had attempted to show, through a variety of 
sources, what the developing international law actually was. 
Hoyt again digressed on the differences between the "hypothetical" 
views of writers and the actual law and the difference between the Eng-
lish and French approaches. He argued that there were no limits on the 
exemption as to the size of the ship and crew, the distance from the shore 
of the vessel, and the length of time the ship could stay at sea. 
After citing other writers on the existence of the exemption and in-
ternational adherence to it, Hoyt then readdressed the question of the 
Cubans' status and reiterated the arguments he had made earlier in the 
brief about the intent and effect of the joint resolution. In retrospect, one 
statement made in this part of the brief is particulary noteworthy. 
Although it did not make any new legal argument, the statement fore-
told, to some degree, the complications associated with future American 
involvement in foreign insurrections: 
141. Id. at 12-13. 
142. Id. at 15-16. 
143. 1 C. Rob. Adm. 20 (1798). 
144. Brief for the United States at 16, The Paquete Habana. 
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The belligerency of the Cubans was never recognized un-
less by the resolution of April 20; that resolution did recognize 
their independence by stating that the Cubans were and ought 
to be free and independent, a somewhat inconsistent statement 
as applied to another people who might not be willing to fight 
for their independence as a people . . . . Did such a recogni-
tion of independence under these circumstances make the Cu-
ban people a State? There is not yet a Cuban State in the list of 
nations, and we are still necessarily carrying on the government 
of that island by a military administration. 145 
25 
After this perceptive sally, Hoyt muddied the waters and spent some 
of the force of his argument by arguing that the joint resolution was a 
political act which affected only the Cubans' political status, not the pri-
vate rights involved in prize matters. 146 This contradicted his earlier and 
more logical argument that the resolution had no political effect at all; it 
also ignored the fact that by virtue of its status as a branch of public 
international law, prize law could not be divorced from politics and pub-
lic affairs. Finally, he concluded his brief with an indirect attack upon 
Kirlin's damages argument, maintaining that the Navy had acted in 
complete good faith in making the captures. 147 
The government's brief was a mixed effort. Hoyt in the earlier sec-
tions of the brief brilliantly refuted Kirlin's contentions regarding the 
Cubans' nationality and the effect of the joint resolution. When address-
ing the question of whether the exemption from capture was part of cus-
tomary international law, however, Hoyt's arguments were diffuse, 
evasive, ill-organized, and based on misunderstandings of both custom-
ary international law and the strategy Kirlin was pursuing through his 
citation of authority. 
The Supreme Court heard oral argument in The Paquete Habana on 
145. [d. at 28. 
146. [d. 
147. [d. at 32-33. Two other briefs were filed prior to the oral argument by counsel who 
did not participate in the argument. Joseph K. McCammon and James H. Hayden 
filed a brief that emphasized the "expediency and humanity" interests underlying 
the exemption, and argued that the Paquete Habana and Lola were "staunch, sea-
worthy" vessels capable of staying out for weeks. Brieffor Captors, Nov. 7, 1899, 
The Paquete Habana. The brief went on to argue that the owners of the vessels did 
not use them for personal livelihood; instead, the vessels were chartered out as in-
vestments. Hence, the owners hardly came within the class of poor fishermen that 
the rule was meant to benefit. The brief emphasized the difference between English 
and continental practice, averring that the European writers were of no value as 
authorities to an American court. [d. at 5-6. The brief then reiterated Hoyt's argu-
ments that the Cuban crew members were enemies, placing particular emphasis 
upon their remaining in Havana throughout the insurrection, and argued that fur-
ther proofs were not warranted because there were no questions of fact in the case. 
[d. at 9-11. George A. King and William B. King filed a brief for certain captors 
who were not otherwise identified. This brief reiterated the arguments that domicile 
controlled status, and therefore the Cuban owners were alien enemies. Brief for 
Certain Captors, Nov. 7, 1899, at 1-7, The Paquete Habana. 
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November 7-8, 1899. Although there is no account of the argument, one 
issue which clearly concerned the Court was Kirlin's assertion that there 
was American precedent from the Mexican War for the exemption of 
fishing boats. This is apparent because on November 11, 1899, Hoyt filed 
a "Statement" on the subject. 148 This curious document began with the 
assertion that no American writer confirmed the exemption, and that the 
Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo,149 which had ended the Mexican War in 
1848, operated prospectively only and protected "persons, not their 
property." Hoyt admitted, however, that a search of formerly confiden-
tial Navy correspondence had revealed a letter of May 14, 1846, from 
Commander Conner of the Home Squadron, stating that Mexican 
coastal fishermen would not be molested. 150 The letter had been favora-
bly endorsed on June 10, 1846, by the historian George Bancroft, then 
serving as Secretary of the Navy.151 This revelation, which confirmed 
Kirlin's argument and was an important precedent, was somewhat em-
barrassing to the government. Hoyt tried to minimize the damage by 
pointing out that later in the war Commodore Stockton had ordered the 
Navy to capture all Mexican vessels off the coast of California. Stock-
ton's action, as opposed to that of Connor, however, had not received 
executive approval. Hoyt reiterated the English view that positive execu-
tive action was necessary for the exemption to apply, and pointed out 
that regardless of Commander Conner's correspondence, the Executive 
had taken no such action to trigger the exemption in the Spanish-Ameri-
can War. 152 Hoyt clearly was surprised by the uncovering of this prece-
dent, and his Statement seems both hastily written and contradictory. 
Kirlin also filed a supplemental brief on November 13, 1899.153 In it 
he addressed the jurisdictional issue, arguing that the 1891 Circuit Court 
of Appeals Act had repealed the $2,000 jurisdictional limit of R.S. 
695,154 and, consequently, direct appeals could now be taken to the 
Supreme Court from final decrees in prize cases, regardless of the 
amounts at issue. Also, he addressed the Cuban nationality issue, arguing 
in a rather circular manner that the owners were "Cubans" because they 
lived in Cuba, that the joint resolution brought them within its ambit, 
and that there was no need to prove the owners had sympathized with 
the insurgents because the language of the joint resolution specifically 
distinguished Cubans from Spaniards. Finally, he reminded the Court 
that the government itself had confirmed the existence of American pre-
148. Statement on Behalf of the United States Relative to Exemption Allowed to Fishing 
Vessels in the Mexican War at 1-4, The Paquete Habana. 
149. Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207. 
150. Statement on Behalf of the United States Relative to Exemption Allowed to Fishing 
Vessels in the Mexican War at 1-4, The Paquete Habana. 
151. Id. at 4. 
152. Id. at 5. 
153. Supplemental Brief for Appellants, Nov. 13, 1899, The Paquete Habana. 
154. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 174, § 11, 13 Stat. 310 (codified at R.S. § 695 (1878»; see 
also supra text accompanying note 95. 
1985] Coastal Fishing Vessel Immunity 27 
cedent, during the Mexican War, for the exemption. ISS Although none of 
these arguments, other than the jurisdictional argument, were new, Kir-
lin did respond effectively to the criticisms leveled by Hoyt concerning 
his use of foreign writers as evidence of the development of international 
law: 
It is not necessary that the claimant should be able to cite 
an adjudicated case holding that the principle contended for is 
a rule of international law .... In a certain sense, there is no 
positive sanction for the rules of international law as there is for 
the principles of municipal law. Long observance of a rule or 
custom, its embodiment in treaties, its recognition in the stan-
dard text books on international law, and the justice, equity, 
and convenience of a principle establish it as a rule which the 
Court . . . may recognize and enforce. If this were not so, 
there could be no advancement in the principles of interna-
tionallaw except by the great Conference of the Powers and by 
the most formal public Conventions; and these, we know are by 
no means the sources from which such principles are 
derived. 156 
When the Justices voted, Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller and the 
senior Associate Justice, John Marshall Harlan, were in the minority. It 
thus fell to the senior Associate Justice in the majority, Horace Gray, to 
assign the writing of the majority opinion. Gray took the opinion 
himself. 157 
C. The Opinion 
Justice Gray's contemporaries stressed his qualities of enormous 
memory and erudition, his faculty for lengthy, thorough research, and 
his tendency toward extensive written exposition.158 He was not known 
for legal innovation, although, as The Paquete Habana would show, Jus-
tice Gray was anything but insensible to the development of law on a 
historical basis.ls9 The most salient feature of his judicial behavior, one 
of particular importance to The Paquete Habana, was his inclination to 
155. Supplemental Brief for Appellants, Nov. 13, 1899, at 3-7, The Paquete Habana. 
156. Id. at 8-9. 
157. Justi<.:e Gray was educated at Harvard, earning an A.B. in 1845 and an LL.B. in 
1849. He was admitted to the bar in 1851, and in 1854 be<.:ame Reporter of the State 
Supreme Judicial Court. a position he held until 1860. In 1864. he was appointed an 
Asso<.:iate Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court. and in 1873, Chief Justice. He 
remained on the state court until 1881. when he was appointed an Associate Justi<.:e 
of the United States Supreme Court. Lowell. Biographical Note OIl Horace Gray 39 
"ROC. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 627, 627-28 (1904). 
158. Id. at 628, 632; see also George F. Hoar in 2 MEMORIALS OF THE JUSTICES OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 270 (R. Jacobs ed. 1981) [hereinafter 
dted as MEMORIALS]. 
159. William A. Maury in MEMORIALS, supra note 158, at 304. 
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analyze matters in the light of historical development. A recent scholar 
has written: 
A member of the most scholarly line on the Court - one 
that began with Cushing and ultimately ran through Story, 
Holmes, Cardozo, and Frankfurter - Gray was also the most 
history-centered, his reasoning to conclusions taking place 
more through the historical or chronological process than did 
that of any other member of the high court. What made Gray 
unique was that he was not only a legal historian observing 
what others did; he was a legal historian on the bench. l60 
A famous contemporary of his, Henry Cabot Lodge, said much the same 
thing: "He was not content with merely stating the point at issue, but in 
some of the decisions we find a review of the entire history of the princi-
ples involved, which falls little short of a treatise on the whole 
subject." 161 
With his predisposition to view matters historically, it is not surpris-
ing that Justice Gray, when given the opportunity to assign the majority 
opinion in The Paquete Habana, chose to write the opinion himself. The 
principal question - whether the exemption for coastal fishing vessels 
was part of customary international law - was essentially an historical 
one. Kirlin's brief, with its numerous citations to authority dating as far 
back as the fourteenth century, must have particularly appealed to him. 
Justice Gray's achievement in writing The Paquete Habana opinion 
must be accounted a tour de force of judicial effort. The case was argued 
on November 7-8, 1899, and the principal briefs were filed at the same 
time. Notwithstanding the intervention of the Christmas holidays, 
Gray's opinion, which required prodigious research, was written, circu-
lated, approved, and ready for announcement two months later on Janu-
ary 8, 1900. 
The announcement of the decision and the reading of the opinions in 
The Paquete Habana was the main order of business on January 8, 
1900. 162 After stating the facts of the captures and condemnations, Gray 
addressed the jurisdictional question that the Court had raised sua 
sponte. The Court rejected the government's contention that there was 
no jurisdiction because the $2,000 limit in R.S. 695 163 was not met and 
held that the Circuit Courts of Appeals Act of 1891 164 had made the 
nature of the case, not the amount involved, the relevant criterion for 
160. Spector, Legal Historian on the United States Supreme Court: Justice Horace Gray. 
Jr .. and the Historical Method, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 181,181 (l968); see also S. 
Mitchell, Mr. Justice Horace Gray (l962) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Wisconsin). 
161. Henry Cabot Lodge in MEMORIALS, supra note 158, at 285. 
162. U.S. Supreme Court, Journal of the Supreme Court of the United States, October 
Term, 1899, at 77 (19OO). 
163. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 174, § 11, 13 Stat. 306, 310 (codified at R.S. § 695 (1878}). 
164. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. 
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appellate jurisdiction. The Act, by providing for direct appeal of final 
decrees in prize without mention of amount, had sub silentio repealed the 
jurisdictional amount of R.S. 695; the $1,000 limit in the 1891 Circuit 
Court of Appeals Act applied only to certain cases which had been 
before a court of appeals. It followed that the Supreme Court had appel-
late jurisdiction over The Paquete Habana. 165 
After disposing of this threshold issue, Justice Gray focused upon 
the merits and phrased the issue as "whether, upon the facts appearing in 
these records, the fishing smacks were subject to capture .... "166 He 
began by positing the basic proposition that "[b]y an ancient usage 
among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening 
into a rule of international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their voca-
tion of catching and bringing in fresh fish, have been recognized as ex-
empt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war."167 
Justice Gray provided an elaborate and comprehensive historical exami-
nation of this exception for coast fishermen. He analyzed decrees of 
Henry IV of England in the fifteenth century, and French, English, and 
Dutch examples of recognition of the exemption prior to American inde-
pendence. 168 He cited the U.S.-Prussian treaty of 1785,169 with its fa-
mous article exempting "scholars of every faculty, cultivators of the 
earth, artisans, manufacturers, and fishermen," from molestation in time 
of war, as an early American recognition of the principle pO 
Justice Gray then turned to what he termed "the only serious inter-
ruptions ... of the general recognition of the exemption,"171 which oc-
curred during the Napoleonic Wars. After detailing the chronology of 
events, he came to The Young Jacob and Johanna, 172 a case the govern-
ment had relied heavily upon in The Paquete Habana for the proposition 
that positive executive action was needed to establish the exemption as 
binding.173 Justice Gray distinguished The Young Jacob and Johanna 
from the present case on two grounds. First, The Young Jacob and Jo-
hanna was a response to a 1798 Order in Council l74 directing the taking 
of fishing vessels, which was promulgated in response to French use of 
such vessels in war. Second, the record in The Young Jacob and Johanna 
contained strong evidence of fraud. 
Recognizing the growth and dynamism of international law, Justice 
165. 175 U.S. 677, 680-86 (1900). 
166. [d. at 686. 
167. [d. 
168. [d. at 686-90. 
169. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Sept. 10, 1785, United States-Prussia, art. XXII, 8 
Stat. 84, T.S. No. 292 (1785). 
170. 175 U.S. 677, 690-91. 
171. !d. at 691. 
172. 1 C. Rob. Adm. 20 (1798). 
173. Brief for the United States at II, The Paquete Habana. 
174. Order of Jan. 24, 1798, in 2 ORTOLAN 53. 
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Gray refuted the government's assertion that there could be no exemp-
tion without positive executive action and resolved the comity argument: 
The opinion begins by admitting the known custom in for-
mer wars not to capture such vessels; adding, however, "but 
this was a rule of comity only, and not of legal decision." As-
suming the phrase "legal decision" . . . as equivalent to "judi-
cial decision," it is true that, so far as appears, there had been 
no such decision on the point in England. The word "comity" 
was apparently used by Lord Stowell as synonymous with cour-
tesy or goodwill. But the period of a hundred years which has 
since elapsed is amply sufficient to have enabled what originally 
may have rested in custom or comity. . . to grow, by the general 
assent of civilized nations, into a settled rule of international 
law. 175 
Justice Gray also provided an exhaustive examination of nineteenth cen-
tury writings and practice to illustrate that the "growth" of which he had 
written had in fact taken place. Beginning with the British action of 
1806, which restored the ancient exception, Justice Gray canvassed the 
American example in the Mexican War, French custom, English conduct 
in the Crimea, and the policy followed by Japan during its war with 
China. 176 
Justice Gray followed his discussion of actual practice with an ex-
amination of the writings of contemporary jurists. He began this seg-
ment of the opinion with a statement that is perhaps the most often-cited 
passage from The Paquete Habana: 
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained 
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdic-
tion as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly 
presentedfor their determination. For this purpose, where there 
is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or 
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages 
of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of 
jurists and commentators. . . . Such works are resorted to by 
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors con-
cerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence 
of what the law really is.l77 
This was a clear rebuff to the government's argument that the Court 
should reject the "speculations" of theorists because they were not ac-
ceptable sources of law.17X Justice Gray understood not only the dy-
namic nature of international custom, but the place of jurists and 
commentators in the civil and international law systems. His examina-
175. 175 U.S. 677, 694 (emphasis added). 
176. [d. at 694-700. 
177. [d. at 700 (emphasis added). 
178. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
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tion of the contemporary sources was as thorough as his historical re-
search and included American, French, Argentine, German, English, 
Dutch, Austrian, Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian writers. I 79 His con-
clusion exhibited this understanding: 
[A]t the present day, by the general consent of the civilized 
nations of the world, and independently of any express treaty or 
other public act, it is an established rule of international law, 
founded on considerations of humanity. . . and of the mutual 
convenience of belligerent states, that coast fishing vessels, with 
their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and 
honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and bring-
ing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of war.180 
The exemption was not a universal one; it did not apply if the vessels 
engaged in warfare, or if naval operations created a state of military ne-
cessity "to which all private interests must give way."181 Nor did it ap-
ply to deep-sea fishing vessels taking fish that were not brought fresh to 
market. Within its limits, however, it was an effective and binding rule of 
internationallaw. 182 
Justice Gray refuted the proposition that positive executive action 
was required to recognize the exemption. He cited Justice Marshall's 
opinion in Brown v. United States,183 which relied on the modern usage of 
nations, I 84 and Justice Strong's statement in The Scotia I 85 that "it is rec-
ognition of the historical fact that by common consent of mankind these 
rules have been acquiesced in as of general obligation. . . . Foreign 
municipal laws must indeed be proved as facts, but it is not so with the 
law of nations." I 86 
Justice Gray closed his opinion by reviewing President McKinley's 
April 26, 1898, proclamation and the correspondence between Rear Ad-
miral Sampson and Secretary Long. 187 Justice Gray interpreted the pre-
amble of the proclamation as evidence of American intent to conduct the 
blockade in compliance with international law. He interpreted Rear Ad-
miral Sampson's dispatch as evidence of his belief that, absent an express 
order to the contrary, coastal fishermen were not subject to arrest. Pro-
viding Secretary Long's reply with a more lenient interpretation than it 
perhaps deserved, Justice Gray viewed it as forbidding the blockade 
squadron from interfering with coastal fishing vessels unless the vessels 
179. 175 U.S. 677, 700-07. 
ISO. /d. at 70S. 
lSI. [d. 
IS2. [d. 
IS3. 12 U.S. (S Cranch) 110 (1S14). 
IS4. [d. at 123, 125. 
ISS. SI U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 (1S72). 
IS6. [d. at ISS. 
IS7. See supra notes 72, 74 and accompanying text. 
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were likely to aid the enemy. 188 
Justice Gray emphasized the facts of the case, pointing out that the 
Paquete Habana and the Lola were small, unarmed vessels engaged in 
coastal fishing. The vessels were not aiding the enemy or trying to run 
the blockade. Moreover, the crews were working for a share of the 
cargo; thus, neither vessel was a "commercial adventure." Therefore, 
Justice Gray concluded that the vessels came within the exemption pro-
vided by international law. The decree of the district court was reversed, 
arid the Court ordered the proceeds of the sales restored to the claimants, 
with damages and costS.189 
Chief Justice Fuller dissented. He was joined in his opinion by John 
Marshall Harlan and Joseph McKenna, the senior and junior Associate 
Justices. Chief Justice Fuller refused to accept Justice Gray's argument 
that a rule of international law, in the absence of executive or legislative 
action, could limit American naval activity. Chief Justice Fuller cited 
Brown v. United States 190 to support his proposition that some form of 
executive or legislative action was a necessary precursor to limitation of 
naval activity by a rule of international law. He noted that the Sampson-
Long correspondence "was entirely consistent with the validity of the 
captures," and concluded that the captures were valid because "it is im-
possible to concede that the Admiral ratified these captures in disregard 
of established international law."191 Chief Justice Fuller criticized the 
exemption for containing numerous exceptions and interfering with cap-
tures directed or ratified by the officer in command. He stated that, even 
if the rule existed, the Paquete Habana and the Lola were large and es-
sentially commercial in nature, and, therefore, should not come within 
the ambit of the rule. After a few examples of contemporary practice 
and citations from treatises which did not treat the rule as established, 
Chief Justice Fuller attacked the "speculations and repetitions"l92 of the 
jurists cited by Justice Gray: "Their lucubrations may be persuasive, but 
not authoritative."193 He summarized his opinion by stating that the Ex-
ecutive possessed the power to grant such exemptions, and in the absence 
of executive action, there was no exemption. 194 
D. Analysis of Opinion 
Three salient points can be made with regard to Justice Gray's opin-
ion. The first is that the opinion is an outstanding historical accomplish-
ment. Although Kirlin had cited numerous historical sources in his 
188. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 712-13 (1900). See supra note 75 for the effect 
of Navy policy. 
189. 175 U.S. 677, 714. 
190.12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814). 
191. 175 U.S. 677,717. 
192. /d. at 720. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 718-21. 
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brief, Justice Gray ranged far beyond Kirlin's citations, relying on an 
enormous volume of research to construct a short treatise on the subject. 
As one writer has commented: 
Paquete Habana was a profound study in the modern law 
of maritime prizes. Few decisions in the history of the United 
States Supreme Court before or since present so vast a diversity 
of sources in support of an opinion. Gray seemed to creep into 
the most forlorn recesses of international law . . . . [His] 
amazing historical equipment included not merely legal mate-
rial but treaties and diplomatic correspondence as well 
195 
Henry Cabot Lodge later called the opinion "very remarkable . . 
The whole history of fishing vessels as subjects of prize in war was set 
forth."I96 The thoroughness with which Justice Gray set about his his-
torical task was indeed astonishing. It is not surprising that there were 
no concurring opinions on the issue of the exemption; Justice Gray had 
exhausted the subject. 
Second, Justice Gray's opinion relied entirely on the international 
law exemption argument made by Kirlin. He did not mention the argu-
ments concerning the effect of the joint resolution on Cuba, the national-
ity of the owners, or the owners' allegiance to Spain, to which the parties 
had devoted much of their briefs. Because Justice Gray did not address 
these points, it was unnecessary for him to delve into the procedural 
questions raised by Kirlin and argued by both parties. Except for his 
treatment of the threshold question of jurisdiction, Justice Gray's entire 
opinion had one focus: proof that an exemption for coastal fishing ves-
sels existed as a rule of international law. 
Third, Justice Gray, although a nineteenth century conservative, 
was receptive to the potential for development of international law. 
Much of his opinion was devoted to showing the development of an in-
ternational consensus for the exemption at issue. 197 Justice Gray's predi-
lection for historical research clearly furnished him with an appreciation 
for continental writers and legal systems that was not shared by much of 
the American bar. 
Chief Justice Fuller's dissent betrays a certain distrust of foreign in-
novations in the law and a reluctance to believe that the United States 
would violate international law in its warmaking. The Chief Justice was 
hampered by the majority's agreement to base the decision only upon the 
international law issue of exemption for coastal fishing vessels. Had Jus-
tice Gray dealt with the Cuban nationality issue, Chief Justice Fuller 
would have had more persuasive arguments at his disposal. 
195. Spector, supra note 160, at 206. 
196. Henry Cabot Lodge in MEMORIALS, supra note 158, at 285. 
197. See 175 U.S. 677, 686·712. 
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V. REACTION AND LAWMAKING, 1900 - 1907 
Following the announcement of the judgment on January 8, 1900, 
Hoyt filed a motion urging the Court to prohibit recovery of punitive 
damages. He argued that the captures were made in good faith and that 
the status of the exemption was not clear, stressing that the important 
Mexican War precedent had been hidden in obscure records. 198 On Jan-
uary 22, 1900, Kirlin filed a brief in opposition to Hoyt's motion, arguing 
that the matter was res judicata, the motion was premature, and the pro-
ceeds of the prize sale were likely less than the vessels' actual values. 199 
On January 29, 1900, the Court granted Hoyt's motion and modified the 
decree to state that only compensatory damages should be awarded.2°O 
The case was remanded to the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida, and a commissioner was appointed to take 
testimony and determine the values of the vessels. An interesting result 
of this testimony was an indication that the vessels may actually have 
been more commercial than appeared in the original case. Jose Pasos, a 
brother of the captain of the Paquete Habana, testified that he, the cap-
tain, and a third brother had owned half of the Paquete Habana - Justa 
Galban owning the other half. He also testified that this investment 
earned them an eighteen to twenty percent return on capital per year, 
and that the ship was worth $4,500 in gold.201 Jose Pasos's testimony 
directly contradicted his brother's earlier statement that neither brother 
had an interest in the vessel. Severo Gonzales, owner of the Lola, testi-
fied that he earned a twenty-two percent return from the vessel per yeal 
and that it was worth $5,000 in gold.202 Such testimony, assuming it 
were true, would not have undercut Justice Gray's findings regarding the 
existence of an exemption in international law. Had the testimony been 
in the record, however, it might have led to a different outcome for the 
Paquete Habana and the Lola, with the Court holding that they did not 
come within the exemption because of their commercial nature. Justice 
Gray relied on the noncommercial status of the vessels to fit them within 
the exemption;203 it is possible that he, and the majority, might have 
viewed the vessels differently if they had not appeared in this guise. 
This is speculation, however, and the fact remained that, with the 
issue shifted from international law to valuation, it was in the interest of 
Kirlin and his clients to make the vessels appear as valuable as possible. 
Kirlin effectively performed this task because the Paquete Habana was 
valued at $5,687.06, and the Lola at $6,643.91.204 The government ap-
198. Motion to Modify Decree at 1-6, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677. 
199. Brief in Opposition to Motion to Modify Decree at 1-2, The Paquete Habana, 175 
U.S. 677. 
200. 175 U.S. 677, 721. 
201. Interrogatories of Jose Pasos at 27, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677. 
202. Interrogatories of Severo Gonzales at 22, The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453 (1903). 
203. 175 U.S. 677, 714. 
204. Report of Commissioner E. O. Locke at 55-58, The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453. 
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pealed on two issues: the amount of damages, and whether the govern-
ment or the naval captors should be liable. Thus, the case returned to 
the Supreme Court.205 
The same counsel argued the case; Hoyt by this time had been pro-
moted to Solicitor General. Oral argument was held on March 19, 1903. 
For the government, as appellant, Hoyt argued that the valuations of the 
ships were excessive, and that the captors, not the United States, should 
pay whatever sums were due the owners. 206 Kirlin, for the appellees, 
argued that the valuations were fair and that the United States should 
pay them.207 
The Court's unanimous decision was announced on April 6, 1903.208 
Justice Gray died before the valuation issue reached the Court and his 
successor, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, wrote the second opinion. 
The Court upheld Kirlin on the question of who should pay the damages, 
stating that the United States had authorized and adopted the acts of the 
captors and, therefore, should be liable.209 The Court reversed the dis-
trict court on the valuation issue, however, holding that the valuations 
were not supported by documentary evidence, and remanded the case to 
the district court for further proceedings.2 \0 
Although neither the argument nor the decision in the principal case 
attracted much general public interest,211 the legal community was quick 
to comment on the importance of the case. One commentator favorably 
contrasted the liberal attitude of the Court toward the development of 
international law with the harsh and formalistic face it had shown in The 
Aduia,212 a case which mechanically applied the continuous voyage prin-
ciple.213 Another commentator praised The Paquete Habana as "an in-
structive instance of ... judicial enlargement of international law."214 
Hoyt himself stated that in The Paquete Habana "the harshness of war 
and the mitigations founded on ethical and human considerations came 
205. Motion to Advance at 1-3, The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453. 
206. Brief for the United States at 18-40, The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453. 
207. Brief for the Appellees at 11-64, The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453. 
208. 189 U.S. 453. 
209. [d. at 464-65. 
210. [d. at 466-68. The case did not come to the Supreme Court again, and none of the 
district court proceedings are reported; accordingly, the final disposition of the valu-
ation issue is not known. 
211. The Washington Post, the Washington Evening Star, and the New York Times did 
not note the argument of the case. The Washington Post reported the decision 
briefly, without comment. See Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1900, at 2. Neither the 
Washington Evening Star nor the New York Times reported the decision. 
212. 176 U.S. 361 (1900). The Court in The Adula upheld the taking in prize of a neu-
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into sharp contrast."215 Perhaps cognizant of the revelations in the sec-
ond Paquete Habana case regarding the vessels' commercial character, 
Hoyt maintained that the government had attempted to distinguish be-
tween larger and smaller coastal vessels, particularly because the smaller 
ones sometimes subsisted blockaders.216 This was something of an ex 
post facto defense, because the argument was not one of the government's 
principal ones. A dissenting English view came from a Justice of the 
King's Bench who maintained that the exception was a precept of comity 
only. He stated, in words that would have an ironic ring in the next 
decade, that "in these days of less rigorous warfare," the "indulgent 
treatment" of "all kinds of fishing boats" was assured.217 An American 
historian, writing some ten years after the decision, criticized the opinion 
on the basis that "the boats were furnishing food to a beleaguered army," 
that "their crews were reservists of the Spanish navy," and that "they 
were intending to violate a blockade" - all dubious propositions.218 On 
balance, it appears that the weight of scholarly opinion approved of The 
Paquete Habana decision. Progress in international law and the amelio-
ration of war conditions were subjects of substantial concern at that time, 
and the Supreme Court's opinion made an important contribution to that 
movement. 
The principles governing naval warfare again became the subject of 
concern when war erupted between Russia and Japan in 1904. This 
struggle, the only naval war involving major powers between 1898 and 
-1914, produced prize litigation that shed light on the scope of the exemp-
tion from capture. As the Supreme Court had noted in The Paquete Ha-
bana, Japan, upon the outbreak of war with China in 1894, had 
announced that coastal fishing vessels would not be molested.219 At the 
beginning of the war with Russia in 1904, after making a similar an-
nouncement,220 Japanese forces captured two Russian deep-sea fishing 
vessels, the Michael and the Alexander, and brought them into Sasebo 
for adjudication. Counsel for the owners evidently argued for develop-
ment of the exemption along the lines formulated by the Institute of In-
ternational Law at Turin in 1882, which would have exempted all fishing 
vessels. Although the Sasebo Prize Court rejected this defense, it recog-
nized the existence of an exemption: 
The claimants also argued that the vessel should be re-
215. Hoyt, Recent Development and Tendency of the Law of Prize, 12 YALE L.J. 306, 314 
(1903). 
216. Id. 
217. Kennedy, The Exemption of Private Property at Sea from Capture in Time of War, 
16 YALE L.J. 381, 382-83 (1907). 
218. F. CHADWICK, THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN: THE SPAN-
ISH-AMERICAN WAR 146-47 (1911). 
219. 175 U.S. 677, 700. 
220. Japanese Regulations, 1904, in H. MARTIN & J. BAKER, LAWS OF MARITIME 
WARFARE AFFECTING RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF BELLIGERENTS AS EXISTING ON 
AUGUST I, 1914 at 516 (1918). 
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leased in accordance with the intention underlying the exemp-
tion from capture of small coastal fishing boats, but the usage 
. . . arises mainly from the desire not to inflict distress upon 
poor people who are not connected with the war, and the prin-
ciple cannot be extended to a vessel like the "Michael," which 
was the property of a company and engaged in deep-sea 
fishing. 221 
On appeal, the Higher Prize Court affirmed in these words: 
It was also argued that a prize court need not be rigidly 
bound by the rules of international law . . . but that it should 
adapt its decisions to varying circumstances and create new 
precedents upon lines which are an advance upon the rules of 
international law. But existing international law recognizes 
that an enemy vessel and enemy cargo . . . may be captured, 
and the hopes expressed that action will be taken in conformity 
with the resolutions of the Institute of International Law, 
which have not yet become rules ofintemationallaw, cannot be 
considered as grounds for appeal. 222 
37 
The Japanese courts, although recognizing the binding force of the ex-
emption with regard to coastal fishing vessels, acutely differentiated be-
tween the consensus of nations - true customary international law -
and what in fact was an academic plan for improvement. In doing so, 
the Japanese court upheld the idea, which characterized Justice Gray's 
opinion, that international consensus could be determined by history and 
practice. 
The war between Japan and Russia was concluded in 1905. The 
previous year, President Theodore Roosevelt had requested an opinion 
from each of the powers regarding the advisability of a Second Peace 
Conference to continue the work of the First Hague Peace Conference of 
1899. The end of the war, and the circumstances under whiCh it was 
ended, provided a favorable climate in which to begin work on such a 
project. After a good deal of diplomatic jockeying, plans matured for a 
Second Hague Peace Conference to meet in June of 1907. 
VI. THE SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE 
The Second Hague Conference is of major importance to the history 
of international arbitration and the development of rules for land war-
fare. Its importance to this article, however, is limited to the adoption of 
rules governing naval warfare, and the effect of The Paquete Habana 
thereon. The instructions from the State Department to American dele-
gates were couched in traditional terms of American naval policy. The 
delegates were to attempt to obtain a general exemption from capture for 
221. The Michael, 2 RUSSIAN AND JAPANESE PRIZE CASES 80, 82 (1904). 
222. [d. at 84-85. 
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all noncontraband goods except when a breach of blockade was at-
tempted, to resist efforts to expand the list of articles regarded as contra-
band, and to attempt to set out in detail the rights and obligations of 
neutrals, in order to prevent war from spreading and to prevent squab-
bles between neutrals and belligerents.223 This was traditional American 
foreign policy - a disinclination to become involved in European quar-
rels, and a solicitude for neutral rights. 224 The instructions to the British 
delegation likewise reflected traditional British maritime policy: rejec-
tion, except under conditions of general disarmament, of immunity from 
capture at sea; substantial restrictions on neutral activities, including the 
closing of neutral ports to foreign prizes unless in actual distress; and the 
fewest possible restrictions on the import of food and peaceful raw mater-
ials by a belligerent, in view of Britain's status as a food importer. 225 
The work of the Second Peace Conference was delegated to four 
commissions, each responsible for one subject. The fourth commission 
dealt with the rules of war at sea, and spent most of its time discussing 
the issue of immunity of private property from capture. Joseph Hodges 
Choate, the chief American delegate, had on June 24, 1907, shortly after 
the Conference opened, presented the American proposal for immunity 
consistent with his instructions.226 
The question of the immunity of coastal fishing vessels first arose on 
August 2, 1907. The delegates agreed that such an exemption existed, 
and one delegate argued that it should be extended to deep-sea fishers as 
well. 227 The first detailed discussion of the question occurred on August 
7, 1907. Count Tornielli of Italy stated that scientific ships should be 
exempt, and Baron von Macchio of Austria-Hungary wanted the exemp-
tion extended to small boats engaged in local business. Commander Fer-
raz of Portugal proposed immunity for coastal vessels as long as they did 
not approach or hinder warships.228 
Choate took the floor and called the attention of the Commission to 
The Paquete Rahana; he quoted Justice Gray's statement that the ex-
emption was an established rule of international law meant to protect 
only innocent vessels furnishing daily food supplies, and that it did not 
afford protection to deep-sea fishermen or those participating in hostili-
223. See generally J. SCOTT, INSTRUCTIONS TO THE AMERICAN DELEGATES TO THE 
HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES AND THEIR OFFICIAL REPORTS 82-84 (1916) (state-
ment of Elihu Root to the United States delegation). 
224. See Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796) in 35 G. WASHINGTON, THE WRITINGS OF 
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225. A. HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES AND OTHER CONFERENCES CON-
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ties. 229 He noted that the Supreme Court had held the exemption for 
coastal fishing vessels was a rule of customary international law which 
prize courts must apply in the absence of treaty or statute. Choate em-
phasized that the vessels in The Paquete Habana fit within the exemption 
because they were engaged in furnishing the daily supply of fish to feed 
the city of Havana.230 
The issue of immunity for coastal fishing vessels was sent to the 
Committee of Examination for the preparation of a draft convention. 
None of the members of this committee denied the existence of the ex-
emption; the issue concerned its limits. Committee members wrangled 
over whether a certain distance from the coast should be specified for 
"coastal" vessels, whether powered boats should be included within the 
ambit of the exception, whether the convention should contain provisions 
for indemnity, and similar matters.23I Eventually a report to the fourth 
commission was produced by the French delegate, Henri Fromageot, 
who was strongly influenced by The Paquete Habana approach. The re-
port cited The Paquete Habana and stated that the exemption was an 
ancient custom, which now had received universal approval. The exemp-
tion served a humanitarian purpose: "[T]o avoid doing poor people, who 
are especially deserving of interest, an injury which would be of no bene-
fit to the belligerent."232 Moreover, it was unwise to set limits on ton-
nage, crew size, or distance from shore in deciding whether the 
exemption applied, because these were matters that should be taken into 
account on a case-by-case basis in deciding whether a particular ship and 
crew were harmless, peaceful, and deserving of protection.233 
The draft convention chapter, unanimously approved by the fourth 
commission, combined Belgian and Portuguese proposals on fishing 
boats, an Austro-Hungarian proposal on small trading vessels, and an 
Italian proposal on scientific/philanthropic vessels.234 It became Chap-
ter II of Hague Convention XI, which, after an allowance is made for the 
treatment of vessels other than fishing smacks, is distinctly reminiscent in 
tone and content of language contained in The Paquete Habana: 
Chapter II. 
Exemption from Capture of 
Certain Vessels. 
Article 3. 
Vessels employed exclusively in coast fisheries, or small 
229. 1£1. at 902-03; see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900). 
230. 1. SCO'IT, supra note 226, at 902-03. 
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boats employed in local trade, are exempt from capture, to-
gether with their appliances, rigging, tackle, and cargo. 
This exemption ceases as soon as they take any part what-
soever in hostilities. 
The Contracting Powers bind themselves not to take ad-
vantage of the harmless character of the said vessels in order to 
use them for military purposes while preserving their peaceful 
appearance. 
Article 4. 
Vessels charged with religious, scientific, or philanthropic 
missions are likewise exempt from capture.235 
The prescience of Justice Gray's estimation regarding the development of 
international law on the subject of exemption from capture was apparent 
from the reaction of the nations when the convention was opened for 
signature. All but four of the nations represented at the conference 
signed the convention. Moreover, none of the signatories attached any 
reservations thereto. 236 
Although it is difficult to assess accurately the effect of The Paquete 
Habana on the adoption of Hague Convention XI, its influence appears 
to have been substantial. There was agreement from the outset that some 
form of immunity existed, but disagreement as to the form it should take. 
Choate's citation of The Paquete Habana to the commission, its influence 
on Fromageot's report, and the wording of the convention article itself, 
all show the influence of Justice Gray's historical analysis and conclu-
sions. Matters had come full circle in less than a single decade. Justice 
Gray had canvassed an enormous range of sources to establish the exist-
ence of the exemption as a rule of customary international law. The 
Hague Convention used Justice Gray's opinion to transmute that cus-
tomary consensus into a multilateral rule of positive international law. 
VII. WORLD WAR I 
Following the Hague Conference of 1907, immunity of coastal fish-
ing vessels generally was accepted as a rule of international law. Ger-
many in 1909, France in 1912, and Austria-Hungary in 1913 revised 
their prize rules to follow the provisions of Hague Convention XI. 237 
Treatise writers of various nations, including Great Britain, treated it as 
an established rule of internationallaw.238 The United States, which had 
235. A. HIGGINS, supra note 225, at 396-97. 
236. [d. at 406, 537; see I J. SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 
1907 at 134-37 (1909) (Fourth Commission's work considered a failure). 
237. H. MARTIN & J. BAKER, supra note 220, at 516-17. 
238. H. BONFII.S, MANUEl. DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 873-75 (1912); C. Du-
PUIS, LE DROIT DE LA GUERRE MARITIME D'APRES LES CONfERENCES DE l.A 
HAYE ET DE LONDRES 206-11 (1911); J. HAl.L, THE LAW OF NAVAl .. WARfARE 
94-95 (1921); 2 J. WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAl. LAW 155-60 (1913). 
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included the coastal fishery exception in its Naval Code of 1900, issued 
new draft instructions in 1913 which comported with Hague Convention 
XI.239 
Much of this certainty, however, evaporated with the outbreak of 
war in Europe in August of 1914. The primary naval belligerents, Great 
Britain and Germany, plunged into blockade confrontation with each 
other over a period of several months. In November of 1914, Britain 
declared the entire North Sea a war zone, ostensibly in response to Ger-
man minelaying. Britain's proclamation specifically subjected fishermen 
to capture, thus raising questions as to their immunity under chapter II, 
article three, of Hague Convention XI. The practical effect of the British 
proclamation, however, given the territory involved, was primarily on 
deep-sea fishers. In a retaliatory declaration, Germany declared the wa-
ters around Britain a war zone, and stated that all enemy merchant ves-
sels within the zone would be destroyed. In response to the German 
declaration, British Orders in Council of March 11, 1915, imposed a de 
facto blockade on Germany (earlier, France and Britain had imposed a 
formal blockade on the German colonies in East Africa). 240 
The international law problems with such blockading and counter-
blockading arose because neither Britain nor Germany followed the 
classical "close-in" form used by the United States in 1898, where ships 
steamed a short distance outside a port to intercept blockade runners. 
By 1914, technology had advanced to the point that a close-in blockade 
of a well-armed adversary was virtually impossible.241 This was due pri-
marily to one improved weapon - the mine - and one new weapon -
the submarine. Britain, which opposed mining as she opposed anything 
that limited the effectiveness of her surface fieet, regarded the act of min-
ing as dishonorable. German mining was the pretext for the first British 
war zone action.242 Germany's chief dilemma, however, concerned the 
submarine, which by its nature could not take prizes into port for adjudi-
cation.243 Moreover, the British began arming merchant ships, which 
meant that German submarines could no longer surface, warn the prize 
that it would be destroyed, and allow the crew to leave, without running 
an unacceptable risk of destruction. The only alternatives open to Ger-
many were abandonment of submarine warfare, thereby relinquishing its 
239. H. MARTIN & J. BAKER, supra note 220, at 516; G. WILSON, DRAFT No.2 FOR 
PROVISIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NAVY DEFINING THE RIGHTS OF BEL-
I.IGERENTS AND NEUTRALS, LAWS OF BLOCKADE AND CONTRABAND OF WAR 20 
(1913). 
240. Garner, Some Questions of International Law in the European War, 9 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 594, 594-96 (1915). 
241. Holtzoff, Some Phases of the Law of Blockade, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 53, 57 (1916). 
242. See A. HIGGINS, supra note 225, at 618, for a discussion of British opposition to the 
use of mines. 
243. Huberich & King, The Development of German Prize Law, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 
517-18 (1918); see The Tello (Superior Court of Prize, June 28, 1916) (German 
submarine unsuccessfully attempted to take a Swedish ship into a German port for 
adjudication). 
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only weapon against the British long-distance blockade, or engagement 
in unlimited submarine warfare, which meant that German submarines 
would attack British shipping without first providing a warning. 
For two years Germany struggled to use the submarine weapon ef-
fectively without bringing the United States into the war. The German 
effort ended in failure and is beyond the scope of this article. It should be 
pointed out, however, that the German attitude that international law 
must take cognizance of technological developments which may require 
modifications in the rules of naval warfare, or jettisoning of outmoded 
rules, seems to be more in line with Justice Gray's idea of international 
law as a dynamic, developing entity than the British attitude that the 
submarine - which had never been condemned either by treaty or inter-
national custom - was per se unlawful,244 Recent scholarship has up-
held, in a convincing manner, the legality under international law of the 
German "operational area" submarine actions in both World Wars.24S 
Although long-distance blockading made contact between coastal 
fishing vessels and blockaders unlikely, cases involving the exception 
arose during the war in both British and French courts. The leading case 
was The Berlin,246 involving a seventy-nine ton German fishing boat cap-
tured 110 miles off Scotland on August 5, 1914.247 In arguing for con-
demnation, counsel for the Crown maintained that if the vessel were 
fishing it could not be coastal, and that if it were not coastal it was taking 
part in hostilities. The Crown further maintained that, because the Ber-
lin was salting the fish, not taking them in alive, it was not a coastal 
fishing boat. 248 
The judge, Sir Samuel Evans, began his opinion by paying tribute to 
The Paquete Habana: 
The history of the varying practices in this and other coun-
tries of exempting from capture in war vessels engaged in coast 
fishing, up to the year 1899 has been given in the Supreme 
Court of the United States of America in the case of the Pa-
quete Habana and the Lola. The judgment of the court was 
delivered by Mr. Justice Gray. It is full of research, learning, 
and historical interest. As such an elaborate and complete re-
sume is available in that judgment, it would be a work of super-
244. [d. at 508-09 (German view was that prize law was national law. which was to be 
applied even if in conflict with principles of international law). For a British view. 
see James, Modem Developments a/the Law a/Prize, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 50S. 510-
11 (1927) (principles of international law allow the sinking of enemy vessels solely 
for reasons of urgent military necessity). 
245. W. MAI.LlSON, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF NAVAl. WARFARE: SUBMARINES IN 
GENERAl. AND LIMITED WARFARE 52-86 (1968). 
246. 2 Lloyd 43 (1914); see J. GARNER, PRIZE LAW DURING THE WORLD WAR: A 
STUDY OF THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE PRIZE COURTS 1914-1924, at 240-43 
(1927). 
247. J. HAI.L, supra note 238, at 95. 
248. 2 Lloyd 43, 43-59 (1914). 
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erogation for me to attempt to perform a similar task.249 
After reviewing the Russo-Japanese War cases of The Michael and The 
Alexander,250 Evans, without deciding the question of the applicability of 
Hague Convention XI, held that the exemption "has become a suffi-
ciently settled doctrine and practice of the law of nations."25I The Ber-
lin, however, did not come within the purview of the exemption because 
"by reason of her size, equipment, and voyage, she was a deep-sea fishing 
vessel engaged in a commercial enterprise which formed part of the trade 
of the enemy country, and as such was properly captured as prize of 
war."252 In a later case, The Stoer,253 involving a trawler which had been 
captured off the Shetland Islands and sunk because of the lack of a prize 
crew, Evans reiterated his view that deep-sea trawlers were not entitled 
to any immunity from capture.254 
A French case, The Marbrouck,255 arose out of the war in the Mid-
dle East. In this case there does not seem to be any doubt as to the ves-
sels' coastal nature; they were small schooners carrying the Turkish flag. 
The question was whether the vessels were "taking part in hostilities" 
and thereby had forfeited the exemption. The French prize court held 
that the boats had participated in hostilities by providing food to block-
aded ports in Syria and Asia Minor and therefore were good prize. 256 
This finding is somewhat troubling, however, unless the boats were oper-
ating under military orders; if boats become participants in warfare 
merely by taking in a cargo of fish, the exemption is rendered virtually 
useless. 
On balance, the belligerents appear to have consistently adhered to 
the exemption during World War 1.257 The long-distance blockade made 
contact with coastal fishing vessels uncommon, and the few cases that 
did arise generally involved deep-sea vessels.258 Nonetheless, the utility 
249. [d. at 63-64. 
250. See supra notes 221-22. 
251. 2 Lloyd 43,66 (1914). The question of the applicability of Hague Convention XI to 
the facts of this case remains unanswered. Article 9 of the Convention provided 
that it was not to apply to a war unless all of the belligerents were parties to it. A. 
HIGGINS, supra note 225, at 401. Montenegro, a belligerent, had not signed it. 
252. [d. at 67-69. 
253. 5 Lloyd 18 (1916). 
254. [d. at 19. 
255. [1918] JOURNAL OFFICIEL 5506 (June 25, 1918). 
256. C. CoLOMBOS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIZE 147 (1940). 
257. Professor Lassa Oppenheim claimed that Germany sank British boats during World 
War I, but did not elaborate. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREA-
TISE 266 (1921). If this were true, it is likely that the British boats were larger deep-
sea vessels, because a submarine, even if it could get into coastal waters, would 
hardly waste one of its limited supply of torpedoes or call attention to itself by 
surfacing to destroy a small coastal smack. 
258. The only American case was The S.S. Appam, 243 U.S. 124 (1917), which involved 
an attempt by a German prize crew to take a British prize into Hampton Roads and 
keep her there indefinitely. The Supreme Court affirmed a decree that had restored 
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of the rule as a matter of international law was evident to the belligerents, 
and it survived the great struggle. 
Although the interwar years of 1918-39 saw a great deal of attention 
paid to the reduction of naval armaments, little attention was paid to the 
law of prize. One relevant international agreement was article twenty-
two of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 governing submarine war-
fare. 259 The treaty provided for tacit recognition of the legality of sub-
marine warfare; however, with regard to recognition of the submarine as 
a weapon which had revolutionized naval warfare, the language of the 
treaty was ambivalent. The treaty contained provisions that required a 
submarine, before sinking a merchantman, to surface and allow the crew 
and passengers to go to a place of safety; the merchantman's life boats 
constituted "a place of safety" only if proximity to land or shipping made 
them so. If this provision were read literally, it would have imposed im-
possible conditions, conditions that were ignored by all belligerents who 
conducted submarine warfare in World War II. 
If read in the context of the traditional immunities afforded vessels 
not participating in hostilities (immunities which included The Paquete 
Habana principle), however, the treaty was a reasonable approach to 
submarine warfare and was generally adhered to by the belligerents in 
World War II. The requirement that a submarine surface prior to attack 
made tactical sense only if the merchantmen were unarmed and not par-
ticipating in hostilities; otherwise, the risk was unacceptable. Armed 
merchantmen, being participants in warfare, forfeited immunity and 
were subject to attack without warning. Unarmed merchantmen, which 
actively participated in hostilities by such acts as travelling in convoys or 
serving as troop transports, likewise were subject to attack. In a general 
war such as World War II, essentially all belligerent merchantmen might 
be deemed to be actively participating in hostilities; therefore, it was rea-
sonable to treat all enemy merchantmen, except perhaps isolated vessels 
outside operational zones or far from usual shipping lanes, as subject to 
attack without warning. 26O Even neutral merchantmen integrated into 
the enemy war effort could be so attacked.261 This policy took into ac-
count both the humanitarian values which underlay the traditional im-
munity of noncombatant vessels and belligerents' interest in the use of 
the submarine as an effective anticommerce weapon. 
VIII. WORLD WAR II 
The history of World War II with respect to blockade is similar to 
the ship and cargo to their owners, on the basis that an American treaty with Ger-
many did not permit the indefinite layup of German prizes in American ports. 
259. International Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, Apr. 
22, 1930, art. XXII, 46 Stat. 2858,2881-2882, T.S. No. 830, at 27, 112 U.N.T.S. 65, 
88. 
260. W. MALLISON, supra note 245, at 119-20. 
261. [d. at 129-30. 
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that of World War I, except that the struggle was fought on a broader 
scale. The development of aircraft as means of antiship and antisubma-
rine warfare, together with improvements in submarines and mines, 
made the long-range aspect of the blockade even more acute. Germany 
carried on unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic, as did the 
United States in the Pacific after 1941. The long-range aspect made con-
tact between hostile warships and coastal fishing vessels highly unlikely, 
and, as a result, there were fewer prize cases than there had been during 
World War I. Because Germany's surface fleet was "bottled up" for 
most of the war and emerged only for hit-and-run raiding, prize taking 
and adjudication by Germany was essentially nonexistent. Only Britain 
had any sizable number of prize cases, and these dealt mostly with con-
traband and reprisa1.262 There were no cases involving fishing boats.263 
The United States had in 1941, as in 1917, directed its navy to ex-
empt coastal fishing vessels from capture.264 Very few prize cases came 
into American courts until the end of the war, when several German 
vessels docked in cities captured by American ground forces were libeled 
in prize. By the end of 1945, eleven prize libels were pending in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.265 
World War II contributed little to prize law, except for refinement 
of the law of contraband and of procedure.266 The Paquete Habana prin-
ciple, although not formally challenged, may have seemed archaic after 
the war because the long-distance blockades used in World War II did 
not concern themselves with coastal fishing vessels. The direction of 
warfare since 1945, however, has taken a different turn, and The Paquete 
Habana has kept its place in the law of naval warfare. 
IX. THE PAQUETE HABANA PRINCIPLE IN LIMITED WARS 
AFTER 1945 
After 1945, warfare took a turn which was not necessarily foresee-
262. Rowson, British Prize Law. 1939-1944, 61 L.Q. REV. 49 (1945); Rowson, British 
Prize Law. 1944-1946,63 L.Q. REV. 337 (1947). At the outbreak of war, Britain and 
the continental countries had issued new prize rules, evidently expecting more cases 
than in fact occurred. After the United States entered the war, Philip C. Jessup 
criticized the Southern District of New York for issuing prize rules that were essen-
tially glosses on those of 1861. Jessup, Prize Rules, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 452-54 
(1942). See also Sereni, Italian Prize Courts. 1866-1942, 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 248 
(1943). 
263. A British author writing in 1940 stated that Germany had "bombed, machine-
gunned or sunk" over 200 fishing vessels in the first year of the war. See C. 
COLOMBOS, supra note 256, at 252. There is no way of knowing how many, if any, 
of these were exempt coastal vessels. 
264. UNITED STATES NAVY, TENTATIVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR GOVERNING MARITIME 
AND AERIAL WARFARE 7 (1941). 
265. Knauth, supra note 91. Most of these were unreported. For reported American 
prize cases, see The Europa, 80 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) and Ling v. 1689 Tons 
of Coal Lying Aboard S.S. Wilhelmina, 78 F. Supp. 57 (W.O. Wash. 1942). 
266. Knauth, supra note 91, at 69. 
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able. General declared wars were replaced by limited wars,267 fought for 
limited objectives. Because many of these wars were fought in less devel-
oped parts of the world where coastal fisheries of the traditional type 
operated, attempts at naval interdiction or blockade in such situations 
involved The Paquete Habana principle. Two of the most notable limited 
wars, Korea and Vietnam, involved the United States in situations of 
naval blockade or interdiction. 
The Korean War involved a theater of operations that was condu-
cive to establishment of a classical naval blockade. Both North and 
South Korea, which occupy a peninsula that extends southward from 
China, were accessible to naval action. Moreover, North Korea had a 
small navy and little airpower that it could use to harass blockade ships. 
Thus, a close naval blockade of North Korea was a feasible strategy. 
The blockade was formally proclaimed in July, 1950, by President 
Truman.268 
During the Korean War, the United States openly flouted The Pa-
quete Habana principle by seizing and summarily destroying all coastal 
fishing vessels that its forces could capture. This policy began in Septem-
ber 1950, with a leaflet campaign which informed North Korean fisher-
men that their boats would be destroyed or confiscated and their crews 
beached if they fished prior to the expulsion of the Communists. The 
rationale behind this policy was that fish were such an important part of 
the Korean diet that foodstuffs could be regarded as contraband. More-
over, there had been numerous instances of fishing boats engaging in 
minelaying or military communications. It was thought that the in-
terdiction of fishing vessels would vastly increase North Korea's supply 
problems. 269 
267. For a discussion of the pre-1967 Arab-Israeli limited war situation, see Brown, 
World War Prize Law Applied in a Limited War Situation: Egyptian Restrictions on 
Neutral Shipping with Israel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 849, 856-73 (1966). The mining of 
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evidence available, it does not appear that the immunity of coastal fishermen was 
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coastal fishing, although one Soviet commercial, refrigerated fish carrier was dam-
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to harm coastal fishing vessels. It appears more likely that the mine was planted to 
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6, 1984, at 1, col. 2; Washington Post, Oct. 12, 1984, at A31, col. I; id., Oct. 4,1984, 
at A23, col. 5; id., Oct. 1, 1984, at A 18, col. 1; id., Sept. 25, 1984, at A 18, col. 2. 
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Seaborne Commerce as a Viable Sanctioning Device, 27 JAG J. 160, 174 (1973); W. 
MALLISON, supra note 245, at 127. 
1985] Coastal Fishing Vessel Immunity 47 
The overwhelmingly superior American naval forces easily elimi-
nated North Korean deep-sea fishing. North Korean coastal fishing, 
however, was much more difficult to eliminate, because the fishermen 
subsisted on their catch and continued to challenge the blockade in order 
to eat. Moreover, their simple wooden boats could be replaced easily if 
they were destroyed, and the heavy-draft American ships often were un-
able to come near the coast. 270 
The effectiveness of the blockade as a military measure is somewhat 
difficult to assess; however, conditions that resulted from imposition of 
the blockade appear to provide support for the humanitarian values im-
plicit in The Paquete Habana opinion and undermine the blockade strat-
egy on practical grounds. The blockade was damaging to the North 
Koreans insofar as it caused substantial suffering among the fishermen 
and other civilians. A large number of North Korean civilians were 
forced to cross over the American lines looking for food.271 There is no 
indication, however, that the combat effectiveness of North Korean or 
Chinese troops was seriously affected. On balance, the decision by the 
United States openly to disregard The Paquete Habana principle during 
the Korean war reasserted the relevance of both the humanity rationale 
and the pragmatism underlying The Paquete Habana opinion. Fishing 
vessels that actually engaged in hostilities rightfully were taken; however, 
the imposition of a general interdiction on coastal fishing was neither 
good law nor good policy. The American action occupied a large 
number of naval personnel who could have been used more effectivley 
elsewhere. Moreover, the destruction of coastal fishing vessels caused 
substantial civilian suffering; yet, because the North Koreans fed their 
soldiers first, destruction of the vessels did not have the desired military 
effect upon the enemy. 
The other significant limited war in which the United States was 
involved was the protracted conflict in Vietnam.272 During the Vietnam 
conflict, the United States kept its naval operations on a lower key than it 
had in Korea; accordingly, there was no formal declaration of blockade. 
The magnitude of United States naval forces in Southeast Asia, however, 
was greater than that involved in Korea. Three different operations in 
the Vietnam naval theater are relevant to this article: Operation Market 
Time, Operation Sea Dragon, and the mining of the North Vietnamese 
coast. 
Operation Market Time was a joint operation conducted by the 
270. M. CAGLE & F. MANSON, supra note 268, at 297. 
271. Id. at 353-57. 
272. The naval "quarantine" of Cuba in 1962 was deployed to prevent warships and 
merchantmen from reaching the island, and was conducted on a long-range basis, so 
that the fishing vessel question did not arise. See generally Christol & Davis, Mari-
time Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of Offensive Weapons and Associated Mate-
rial to Cuba. 1962, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (1963); Mallison, Limited Naval 
Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction: National and Collective Self-Deji?l1se Claims 
Valid Under International Law, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 335 (1962). 
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United States and South Vietnam off the South Vietnamese coast. The 
purpose of the operation was to control infiltration of men and material 
by sea. The operation was based not on blockade, because blockade was 
viewed as an act of war, but on South Vietnam's inherent right to control 
passage through its territorial waters. Under the 1958 Geneva Covention 
on the Law of the Sea,273 South Vietnam, for security reasons, could sus-
pend the right of innocent passage up to twelve miles offshore.274 Ameri-
can and South Vietnamese warships plied the coasts of South Vietnam, 
stopping and searching suspicious vessels. The scope of the operations 
was enormous; between 1965 and 1967, the American forces discovered 
73,000 vessels, inspected 15,000 vessels, and boarded 6,000 vessels; the 
South Vietnamese inspected 204,000 vessels.275 Although coastal fishing 
vessels were not exempt from inspection, Operation Market Time con-
formed to the essence of The Paquete Habana principle because such 
vessels were not molested unless they carried contraband or engaged in 
the hositilites.276 
Operation Sea Dragon more closely resembled a classical blockade 
because it involved action off the enemy coast. Essentially, Operation 
Sea Dragon consisted of operations within twelve miles of the North 
Vietnamese coast aimed at interdicting North Vietnamese logistical sup-
port for its forces in the south. It included surveillance of vessels, de-
struction of water-borne logistic craft, and naval gunfire aimed at shore 
points. Particularly notable was the length to which the American forces 
in this "quasi-close blockade" situation went to comply with The Paquete 
Habana principle and the requirements of Hague Convention XI. Be-
cause it was difficult to distinguish boats engaged in fishing from those 
taking part in hostilities, a detailed study was made of fishing practices in 
the Gulf of Tonkin. From this study, a profile was created which pur-
ported to characterize legitimate fishermen. Detailed operational orders 
were drafted on the basis of this profile; the objective was to perform the 
military mission without molesting peaceful fishermen. 277 This was an 
innovative and praiseworthy attempt to obey the dictates of international 
law in a complex limited war situation. 
The mining of the North Vietnamese coasts, and later Haiphong 
harbor, in 1972 and 1973 was essentially a "blockade" achieved through 
the use of mines; its objective was to interdict traffic to North Vietnam 
while minimizing the potential for a naval confrontation. Here, as in 
Operation Sea Dragon, the United States used ingenious methods to 
achieve military objectives while attempting to afford coastal fishing ves-
273. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 
XVI, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1611, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 216. 
274. Carlisle, The Interrelationship of International Law alld United States Naval Opera-
tions in Southeast Asia, 22 JAG J. 8, 11-13 (1967); O'Connell, Internatiollal Law 
and Contemporary Naval Operations, 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 19,24-25 (1970). 
275. Carlisle, supra note 274, at 13. 
276. Id. 
277. O'Connell, supra note 274, at 33-35. 
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sels their traditional immunity. Magnetic mines were used which would 
explode if touched by the metal hull of a merchantman, but not if 
touched by the wooden hull of a fishing boat. Contemporaneously, the 
United States announced it would use other forms of mines if the fishing 
boats were used for military purposes.278 The mining achieved its objec-
tive. It forced North Vietnam to the bargaining table; however, it did so 
without compromising the humanitarian values inherent in The Paquete 
Rahana exemption. 
In Vietnam, the United States fought a war of naval interdiction 
with a scrupulous regard for international law and, indeed, a willingness 
to use innovative methods to comply with its responsibilities in new and 
difficult situations. This effort evidences the continuing validity of The 
Paquete Rahana principle. 
A recent development involving the United States, although not to 
the extent of the limited wars in Korea and Vietnam, also brings to mind 
The Paquete Rahana principle. In April, 1984, it was revealed that Latin 
American employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, operating from 
CIA-controlled ships, had laid mines in and near the Nicaraguan harbors 
of Corinto and Puerto Sandino, on the Pacific coast, and EI Bluff, on the 
Caribbean coast.279 The mines were rather crude handmade acoustic de-
vices, evidently designed to explode noisily, cause minimal damage, and 
thus frighten away ships instead of sinking them.280 Some eight ships, 
however, were sunk or damaged by the mines.281 The majority of these 
were non-Nicaraguan freighters and tankers; however, two Nicaraguan 
fishing boats were sunk, with two fatalities and a number of injuries. A 
number of crewmen on the non-Nicaraguan ships were also injured. 282 
The episode caused a furor in Congress,283 and eventually resulted in the 
passage of a nonbinding "sense of the Congress" resolution opposing the 
use of any appropriated funds for the mining of Nicaraguan ports or 
waters.284 \ 
Although the facts surrounding the laying of mines in Nicaraguan 
waters are by no means completely clear, the destruction of Nicaraguan 
coastal fishing vessels makes The Paquete Rahana principle relevant. It 
278. Clark, supra note 269, at 175-78; Swayze, Traditional Principles of Blockade in Mod-
ern Practice: United States Mining of Internal and Territorial Waters of North Viet-
nam, 29 JAG J. 143, 159 (1977). 
279. Wall Street Journal, Apr. 6, 1984, at 6, col. I; Washington Post, Apr. 7, 1984, at 
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280. Washington Post, Apr. 7, 1984, at AI, col. 1; 130 Congo Rec. H2897 (daily ed. Apr. 
12, 1984) (statement of Rep. Siljander). 
281. Washington Post, Apr. 7, 1984, at AI, col. I; 130 Congo Rec. S4140-41 (daily ed. 
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appears that the mines were laid indiscriminately, both in and around the 
harbors, in order to deter commerce and navigation.285 At least one of 
the ports, El Bluff, is relatively small and obscure, precisely the sort of 
harbor from which coastal fishermen frequently operate.286 Although it 
is not certain the two fishing boats sunk were the sort of coastal vessels 
that The Paquete Habana principle protects, the indiscriminate mine lay-
ing in harbors and waters used by protected coastal fishermen demon-
strates an insensitivity to the immunity afforded fishing vessels under 
international law. The United States clearly failed to operate in Nicara-
gua with the sensitivity to international law that it demonstrated during 
the Vietnam conflict. 
x. THE LARGER HERITAGE OF THE PAQUETE HABANA 
Before concluding a study of the influence of The Paquete Habana, 
it is necessary to examine its general influence on American law, outside 
the law of naval warfare. Justice Gray's statement that "international 
law is part of our law,"287 and his view of international law as a growing 
and changing consensus of nations, have borne fruit recently in some 
remarkable opinions from the federal courts. 
The basic principle that United States courts must determine and 
apply international law has been recognized in many contexts, including 
the Trading With The Enemy Act,288 the interdiction ofnarcotics,289 and 
even litigation concerning the conditions in United States prisons.290 Re-
cently, The Paquete Habana has been applied in two cases that illustrate 
the enduring quality of Justice Gray's concern for an effective and devel-
oping corpus of international law. 
Fernandez v. Wilkinson 291 was a habeas corpus proceeding involving 
a Cuban "boat person" who had been jailed without a hearing for violat-
ing United States immigration laws. The McCarran-Walter Act292 (the 
immigration statute) provided an excludable alien with no remedy for 
arbitrary detention. The district court held, however, that international 
law did provide such a remedy, and cited The Paquete Habana and Fi-
lartiga v. Pena-Irala293 as authority for the development of international 
law, its sources, and its place in American law. Finding that freedom 
285. Washington Post, Apr. 7, 1984, at AI, col. 1; 130 Congo Rec. H2885 (daily ed. Apr. 
12, 1984) (statement of Rep. Weiss). 
286. 130 Congo Rec. S4140-41 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1984) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
287. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
288. Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1959). 
289. United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1207 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 
(1979). 
290. Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1192 (D. Conn. 1980), modified, 651 F.2d 96 
(2d Cir. 1981). 
291. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), ajJ'd on other grounds sub nom. Rodriguez-Fer-
nandez v. Wilk, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). 
292. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.c. § 11 0 lI!). 
293. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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from arbitrary detention was a right secured by the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights,294 the court cited the United Nations Charter295 
and a concurring opinion in the International Court of Justice in the 
South- West Africa Cases296 to the effect that international consensus and 
custom can bind non signatories to the terms of an international agree-
ment. 297 The court emphasized the growth and development of a cus-
tomary international law of human rights and ordered the petitioner's 
release within a set time. 298 
Even more striking is Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,299 a case which closely 
parallels The Paquete Habana. The plaintiffs were Paraguayan citizens 
who had applied for asylum in the United States. They brought a civil 
action against the defendant, a Paraguayan visiting the United States, 
under the Alien Tort Statute300 for the wrongful death of their son by 
torture in Paraguay. The issue was whether the district court had juris-
diction over such an action. The court of appeals cited The Paquete Ha-
bana for the proposition that a rule of comity could ripen into settled 
international law, stating that courts must interpret international law "as 
it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today."30\ The 
court, in the manner of Justice Gray, proceeded to survey the interna-
tional law on the subject of torture, to discern whether there was a con-
sensus as to the law and, if so, to determine what the consensus was. It 
examined the United Nations Charter,302 the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,303 General Assembly Resolution 2625 of 1970 on inter-
national law, 304 and General Assembly Resolution 3452 of 1975 on the 
protection of persons from being subjected to torture. 305 Noting that the 
General Assembly had adopted these resolutions by consensus and with-
out dissent,306 the court conducted further examination of the works of 
jurists and publicists on the subject. 307 Following its examination, the 
court concluded that torture was a violation of customary international 
law, and that the Alien Tort Statute granted the district court jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate rights secured by international law. 308 The court 
294. 3 U.N. GAOR C.3 Annexes (Agenda Item 58) at 535, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948). 
295. U.N. CHARTER. 
296. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Nambia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.e.]. 16, 76 (Ammoun, V.P., concurring). 
297. /d. 
298. 505 F. Supp. 787, 796-800 (D. Kan. 1980). 
299. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
300. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). 
301. 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980). 
302. See supra note 295 and accompanying text. 
303. See supra note 294 and accompanying text. 
304. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). 
305. G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975). 
306. 630 F.2d 876, 893 (2d Cir. 1980). 
307. [d. at 883-84. 
308. [d. at 881-89. 
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closed with an eloquent statement which echoed Justice Gray's findings 
on the international consensus on naval warfare: 
In the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations 
have combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize 
that respect for fundamental rights is in their national and col-
lective self-interest. Among the rights universally proclaimed 
by all nations, as we have noted, is the right to be free of physi-
cal torture. Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer 
has become - like the pirate and the slave trader before him -
hostis humani generis, an enemy to all mankind. Our holding 
today. . . is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the 
ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence. 309 
Certainly these opinions, based not only on The Paquete Habana 
itself, but also on Justice Gray's methodology and his conception of an 
evolving body of international law, are fitting tributes to the continued 
importance of the ideals of The Paquete Habana to American 
jurisprudence. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
The Paquete Habana did not emerge ex nihilo. The decision, like 
the sources it canvassed, was the product of an extended development of 
international law. A century of American prize and admiralty law and a 
tradition of international law dating back to Justice Marshall contributed 
to Justice Gray's opinion. Nonetheless, this should not denigrate Justice 
Gray's contribution. His prodigious historical research, his sense of or-
der, and his conception of a living and growing international law based 
on the consensus of nations made The Paquete Habana an important 
precedent in international law. 
The opinion exerted a strong influence on the law of naval warfare. 
It established a principle of immunity, later incorporated into an interna-
tional convention, which has survived two world wars and numerous 
smaller ones. Recent experience in Vietnam demonstrates that the 
United States will go to extraordinary lengths to comply with The Pa-
quete Habana principle. Perhaps more important than the principle itself 
is the illustration it provides of the survival and progression of interna-
tional law through great upheavals and difficult times. 
The Paquete Habana, however, is more than merely a decision about 
naval warfare. Its declaration that "international law is part of our law" 
is both a hope and a promise - a hope for the continued development of 
a system of world order based on international consensus and a promise 
of American participation in the development of that system. As is ap-
parent from Filartiga v. Pena-Irala31O and Fernandez v. Wilkinson,311 the 
309. [d. at 890. 
310. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
311. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980). 
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development of international law continues to inform our judiciary. The 
thread running through the lengthy historical analysis is the survival and 
development of international law. Justice Gray might well be pleasantly 
surprised at the innovations the United States used in Vietnam to comply 
with international law and the use of The Paquete Rahana in such areas 
as immigration law. But in one respect, Justice Gray would not be sur-
prised. The vitality of customary international law continues. Although 
the form of international law may vary with the times and the needs of 
nations, it will endure. This is the true import of The Paquete Rahana. 
